vexing questions

This is my problem with Sola Scriptura: If “Scripture” means the manuscripts we have, then Scripture is fallible. If “Scripture” means the original autographs (some idealized form, or remote divine intentions), then Scripture is not the rule we possess. Therefore Scripture cannot be both the infallible rule and the operative rule. The argument below formalizes this:

S ≝ Sola Scriptura is true

Rx ≝ x is an operative rule of faith

Ix ≝ x is infallible

Ax ≝ x is the original infallible texts (say the autographs or some other remote object)

Cx ≝ x is a copy of the original infallible texts that have been transmitted by a fallible manuscript tradition.

s ≝ scripture

1. S → (Rs & Is) (premise)

If Sola Scripture is true, then scripture is an operative rule of faith and scripture is reliable.

[Justification: This implication is based on a common definition of Sola Scriptura, one which is the target of this argument]

2. Rs → Cs (premise)

If scripture is an operative rule of faith, then scripture is a copy of the original infallible texts that have been transmitted by a fallible manuscript traditions.

[Justification: For a rule to be operative, it must be something of which the Church is in possession. The scriptures commonly used as a rule of faith are copies as we do not have any of the original infallible texts.

3. Cs → ~Is (premise)

If scripture is a copy of the original infallible texts that have been transmitted by a fallible manuscript traditions, then it is not the case that scripture is infallible.

[Justification: Copies of the original infallible texts are adulterated with interpolations, textual variants, insertions, omissions, etc. Those changes have introduced errors into the text when compared to the original infallible texts, and so the copies cannot be, themselves infallible. To say that the copies “contain infallible scriptures” is no different than saying that this hamburger patty contains 100% beef. It is a clever marketing ploy at best].

Deduction:

4. S (Assumption for Indirect Proof)

Assume Sola Scriptura is true.

5. Rs & Is (1,4 MP)

6. Rs (5 Simp)

7. Cs (2,6 MP)

8. ~Is (3,7 MP)

9. Is (5 Simp)

10. Is & ~Is (8,9 Conj)

11.~S (4-10 IP)

It is not the case that Sola Scriptura is true.

Of course, one might reject the notion that Scripture is the copies, so here is another deduction, which shows that this is truly a dilemma:

12. Is → As (premise)

If scripture is infallible, then scripture is the original infallible texts.

[Justification: the original infallible texts penned by prophets and apostles are surely inspired by God, if any version of scripture derived from them is inspired, i.e. the causal adequacy principle would hold that the effect cannot exceed the cause]

13. As → ~Rs (premise)

If scripture is the original infallible texts, then scripture is not an operative rule of faith.

Deduction:

14. S (Assumption for Indirect Proof)

15. Rs & Is (1,14 MP)

16. Is (15 Simp)

17. As (12,16 MP)

18. ~Rs (13,17 MP)

19. Rs (15 Simp)

20. Rs & ~Rs (18,19 Conj)

21.~S (14-20 IP)

At the heart of this dilemma is an equivocal sense of scripture. Is scripture what we have or what was original written. If is it what we have, it is not an infallible rule (at best it is a fallible rule). If it is what was originally written, then it is not a rule, i.e. something that functions as a usable and accessible norm (at best it is as an infallible writing that once was a rule in the past).

Account of of Scriptural Inerrancy and the Epistemic Certitude of Faith:

1. Inspiration and Inerrancy

Inspiration works through human authors situated in historical, cultural, and writing in literary and phenomenological contexts that vary with respect to what would count as “error”. Inerrancy, therefore, does not mean that every line must be free of all possible textual, or scientific inaccuracies. Rather, it means that the assertions God intended to communicate through the sacred authors are without error (cf. Dei Verbum 11).

2. Texts, Manuscripts, and Material Textual Fallibility

The material texts of Scripture as they exist in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Syriac, and other linguistic traditions can (and actually do) contain errors, omissions, and variant readings. This issue extends into canonical questions that scripture, alone, is incapable of determining. This does not compromise inerrancy, because inerrancy is not a property of matter as such, but of meaning. Scripture involves a composite of form and matter; error pertains to the material vehicle, while inerrancy pertains to the inspired sense of scripture. In this regard, I partially agree with the Protestant move to place “infallibility” (wrong word) on something related to the texts we have (i.e. God’s speech-acts, propositional content, etc.). The problem for such moves, however, is that the access to these “infallible” objects of scripture must be, on Protestantism, fallible, and this renders their own solution effete, hence my objection that “infallibility” does no work on that system, and merely remains a rhetorical intensifier to express a misplaced piety.

3. Form, Meaning, and the Subject of Truth

Material inscriptions are necessary to express Scripture within a human community, but they are not themselves the subject of truth or falsity in the fullest metaphysical sense. To be pedantic, Ink blotches acquire meaning; they are not semantically determinate of themselves. Truth and error are predicated of propositions as understood, not the physical linguistic expressions, or copies of expressions we happen to have. To understand this, I propose the following argument:

A Rossian Argument against a form of Sola Scriptura that would suggest Physical Manuscripts of Scripture are Infallible.

1. If Sola Scriptura is true, then there are [physical texts of Scripture] that are [infallible things] [Premise (follows from the implication of Sola Scriptura that the scriptures we physically possess are not merely materially sufficient, but formally sufficient on their own, i.e. apart from any external source such as an infallibly guided Church or tradition)]

2. No [semantically indeterminate things] are [infallible things] [Premise [follows from the fact that something semantically indeterminate does not, of itself, preclude erroneous semantical interpretations]).

3. All [physical texts of Scripture] are [semantically indeterminate things] [Premise (follows from Ross’s premise that physical processes/objects are semantically indeterminate)].

Therefore,

4. No [physical texts of Scripture] are [infallible things] [From 2,3 Modus Celarent].

5. It is false that some [physical texts of scripture] are [infallible things] [4 by E-I Contradiction].

6. It is false that there are [physical texts of scripture] that are [infallible things] [From 5 by Semantic Equivalence (i.e. the particular quantifier in categorical logic and existential quantifier in predicate logic function equivalently)].

Therefore,

7. Sola Scriptura is not true. (from 1,6, Modus Tollens)

Accordingly, the formal aspect of Scripture, its sense and meaning, is safeguarded and authentically interpreted by the Church (cf. Session II of the First Vatican Council, esp. ” I accept sacred scripture according to that sense which holy mother church held and holds”), not generated by the text in isolation (i.e. sola). As Dei Verbum teaches, “sacred tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church… are so linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others” (DV II.10).

4. Thomistic Reception and Non-Distortion

Here a Thomistic analogy is helpful. Aquinas teaches that the possible (passive) intellect, per se, is not deceived about the quiddity it receives; error arises not in simple apprehension, but in subsequent composition, division, or discursive reasoning (ST I, q.85, a.6; q.17, a.3).

Analogously, the reception of the formal sense of Scripture is not itself distorting, even when the material linguistic expressions through which that sense is conveyed are imperfect. Distortion arises when one attempts to reconstruct or rearrange the content by private judgment rather than receive it as proposed. And to clarify, it is not the Church that proposes, it is the Holy Spirit, but the Church is the infallible teach of what the Holy Spirit is proposing via scripture.

5. Inerrancy of Scripture vs. Infallibility of the Church

To that end, Scripture’s inerrancy derives from its divine authorship, not from the Church. The Church does not make Scripture inerrant; she recognizes, preserves, and authoritatively proposes its inerrant sense.

By contrast, infallibility is a property of certain ecclesial acts—that is, of propositional attitudes expressed in authoritative judgments (“we declare,” “we define,” “we anathematize”). Scripture is inerrant; the Church is infallible in proposing its meaning. I often note that Protestantism lends itself to dropping this propositional context, and so importing their judgments onto the text, which I believe is the root behind the notion that the Bible is “infallible”. That is, what the Protestant believes, interprets, or judges about scripture is flattened to “infallible Biblical teaching” and the subject and object collapses. They are like the scientist who forgets he, as the experimenter, is part of the experiment. And every Catholic has encountered this, especially among the most zealous evangelicals, i.e. the conflation of their theological judgments with scripture itself, and the contrapositive accusation that Catholic theological derivations from scripture are “unbiblical”. “Where is that in the Bible” is met with some verse that is quickly reinterpreted away, and the Protestant safely continues to persist that “the Bible doesn’t teach that”. The disagreement, though, is over how the Biblical data is to be interpreted and understood, not whether there is material texts used to support doctrine.

6. Passive (Derivative) Certitude of Faith

There is also an epistemological dimension that must be added. Catholic faith is mediated through an infallible teacher. This does not render the faithful personally “actively” infallible; rather, it means that their assent is certain because the authority proposing the object of faith is infallible, at least passively so. The Church is infallible, so there is a sense in which the laity participate in that charism (cf. Lumen Gentium 12, “The entire body of the faithful, anointed as they are by the Holy One,(111) cannot err in matters of belief. They manifest this special property by means of the whole peoples’ supernatural discernment in matters of faith when “from the Bishops down to the last of the lay faithful” (8*) they show universal agreement in matters of faith and morals.”

This again mirrors the Aquinas active/passive intellect intellect analogy I used for the matter and form of scripture: the Magisterium actively proposes the form of revealed truth; the faithful receive it without distortion. The assent of faith is therefore certain and indefectible, not because the believer reasons infallibly, but because the proposer is infallible.

Faith, moreover, is a supernatural grace, not the terminus of inductive reasoning about manuscripts, textual variants, or exegetical probabilities (cf. Newman’s Faith and Private Judgment: “Since men now-a-days deduce from Scripture, instead of believing a teacher, you may expect to see them waver about; they will feel the force of their own deductions more strongly at one time than at another, they will change their minds about them, or perhaps deny them altogether; whereas this cannot be, while a man has faith, that is, belief that what a preacher says to him comes from God.” Such reasoning may dispose one toward faith, but it cannot produce the certitude proper to faith. Confusing faith with probabilistic inference amounts to a kind of intellectual Pelagianism (cf. ST. II.II.6.1. “The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith”).

7. My Starbucks Analogy

Suppose my wife gives a very complex order at Starbucks. If I actively try to repeat that order in my own words, I may err. But if I simply say, “I’ll have what she’s having,” I cannot be wrong—not because I am competent, but because I defer entirely to the authority of the speaker.

Likewise, the faithful are not asked to reconstruct the deposit of faith by private judgment; they are asked to assent to what is infallibly proposed. Certitude comes from deference to authority, not from personal reconstructions of scripture by way of exegesis and textual criticism, as important as those sciences are.

8. Manuscript Traditions and the Canon

The LXX, Masoretic Text, Old Latin, Vulgate, Syriac, Samaritan Pentateuch, Dead Sea Scrolls, and other traditions all provide valuable data. Textual criticism can recover highly reliable readings, but the canonical content and true sense of Scripture are known only within the Church’s living Tradition, liturgy, and Magisterium, not by textual science alone.

This is evident in Trent’s debates over the longer ending of Mark and in the CDF’s comments on the Johannine Comma: these questions are open to scholarly scrutiny, but whether a text is inspired is ultimately a judgment of the Church, not of academia. This is why I am happy to include 1 John 5:7 as inspired and inerrant, even if not found in the early Greek manuscripts (I think they may have been lost during the Arian controversy and survived in the Old Latin, as we see through Cyprian).

9. The Protestant Epistemic Problem

My critique of Protestantism is both ontological and epistemological. It leads to a fallible list of infallible books, preserved in fallible manuscripts, interpreted by fallible exegetes, resulting in a fallible theology.

Under such a model, it is unclear what practical work the term “infallible” performs. Whatever is said to be infallible is inaccessible in principle; whatever is accessible as an operative rule of faith is necessarily fallible (my fundamental dilemma for Sola Scriptura).

Thus, definitions of Sola Scriptura that describe Scripture as the sole infallible rule of faith trade on an equivocation between Scripture as an infallible ideal (original autographs, divine speech-acts, propositional content) and the only things we actually possess, material expressions that can never be formally identical with that ideal so as to confer infallibility on any reconstruction a given Church uses.

10. A Metaphysical Parallel

This mirrors the realism/anti-realism debate in epistemology. On representationalist models, mental representations can only be similar to external objects, which introduces a creeping skepticism (arguably the primary issue in Modern Philosophy once Ockham’s attack on realism was accepted). Analogously, textual representations can only be similar to an inaccessible infallible object, which is corrosive to a property like infallibility.

By contrast, on realist accounts, the intellect grasps the form of the object itself, and external world skepticism is avoided, at least with respect to essences and forms. The Church, similarly, grasps the formal aspect (sense) of Scripture, even when the material linguistic expressions that participate in that form fall short in various respects (as Socrates might put it, cf. the Phaedo).

Note:

This is why I have found the tu quoque response ineffective. I have a very different epistemology. I suspect some will try to appropriate as much of my claims as they can into the Protestant paradigm while holding onto Sola Scriptura. My Anglican respondents do this, and effectively have accepted certain infallible features of the Church in ways the Eastern Orthodox would accept. But both Anglicans and Eastern Orthodox have Protestant-like epistemic problems, hence the “Orthobros” essentially embrace aspects of tradition and magisterial teaching that comport with their private judgments, so long as they are based and red-pilled. “Rad Trads” are the same, essentially adopting modernist epistemology while larping in the tradition.

Among the documents of the Eighth Ecumenical Council (Catholic), we find an Encyclical Letter composed by the Council Fathers. (PL 129 183-9). There are some very intriguing quotes that speak of the Council’s understanding of its own authority in contrast with that of Photius. They write, “For the whole Church of our Christ and Savior rejoices, and gratifying him, she will sing glorifications, crying out again with the prophet David: The Lord is faithful in all his words, and holy in all his works (Ps. 144) . For he who said to his holy disciples and apostles: And behold, I am with you always, even to the consummation of the age (Matt. XXXVIII) ; and he said to Peter, the most important summit of the apostles: You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it (Matt. XVI) : many times other gates of hell, opened against the Church, and tempting to devour it, he blocked, crushed, and destroyed, namely heretical opinions, and the wicked attempts which arose in past generations in their own times, but nevertheless in the present times when hell opens and widens its own mouth against the Church of Christ, in a similar and equal manner Christ our God has become its protector, who espoused it, and in many ways and in many ways stopped the mouths of the wicked speakers, and freed it from their injury and pestilence” (PL 129, 184B-C, Google Translate). Note the reference to Peter and Matthew 16. The point of the letter, and the council more generally, is to defend the papacy against the actions of Photius. This can be seen in light of the 21st anathema from the council.¹

Speaking of Photius, specifically they write, “But in the end, not listening, he received anathema from Christ and the apostles. Then, then, even more furious, and far removed from his senses and from all rational mind, he sharpened his tongue even against the same, namely the most blessed Pope, and just as fables invent and form hippocentaurs and tragelapas, so also he himself, taking men from the streets and calling them vicars of the other three sees, and proposing them, presumptuously imagined a synodal judgment, imagining and simulating the persons of the accusers and accusers and witnesses, and emperors, and magnates, and metropolitans, as if they were suspects, and in such a way that He thought, shamelessly deposed, and subjected to anathema the most blessed Pope Nicholas, and all those who communicated with him, sparing neither his head, nor, what is more, the Church which exists from end to end in any way, which, namely, was undoubtedly in communion with God, having accepted him and the imitator of Christ and the great pontiff. But the Lord of knowledge, both looking at his manifest wickedness, and at the works of darkness which he had secretly done, that is, the vainglorious books which he had falsely written against that most blessed Pope…” (Ibid. 186A-B, Google Translate).

In other words, they accuse Photius of schism, and of inventing his own church governance by which he could convene a synod in 867 to excommunicate Pope Nicholas. They invoke the authority of the council to condemn Photius and those who stand with him, “Therefore, let any of those who are worthy of the Christian name, and who have received pastoral government: or who seem to be ruled by another, dare to do anything contrary to this holy and universal synod, and thereby be found to be contradicting the God of all, and despising his counsel and judgment. For the great apostle Paul says somewhere: Therefore he who rejects us, rejects not man, but the living God, who has given us his Holy Spirit (2 Thess. 4) . And some of our detractors also say: If anyone is separated from the truth, he will not inherit the kingdom of God, but will be condemned to hell. And again: If anyone walks after another’s opinion, he is not of Christ: do not mix with such, lest you perish with him. For who does not know that in the midst of this holy and universal synod  would be incomprehensible and uncircumscribed Christ and the Lord who said:  Where two or three are in my name, there am I in the midst of them (Matt. XVIII) : and by his will all things moved by God this holy and universal synod will both deal with and do? And since the God of all says by the voice of the prophet Isaiah:  And I will give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder, and he shall open; and there shall be none to shut: and he shall shut, and there shall be none to open (Isa. XXII) . And again the Scripture Job says:  If he destroy, who shall build? if he shut against man, who shall open (Job XII) ? It is certain, that whoever wishes to open the door which this holy and universal synod has shut, or attempts to close which God has opened…” (Ibid. 188C-D, Google Translate).

By referencing the key of the house of David, the Council Fathers explicitly apply the typology of Eliakim’s stewardship to the Church’s magisterial authority exercised in an ecumenical synod under communion with the Roman Pontiff. This demonstrates that the council understood its own judgments not as a direct participation in Christ’s Davidic authority mediated through His appointed steward.

Photius, in contrast, is condemned not simply for doctrinal error but for his false counter-ecclesiology, which amounts to a usurpation of governance. That is, he is accused of fabricating a parallel ecclesial structure, appointing counterfeit “vicars” and convening a pseudo-synod to judge the Pope. In this light, the council’s appeal to Isaiah 22:22 shows that the Council’s operation of the key to “shut” is properly grounded and derived correctly. In contrast, Photius’s pseudo-synod is portrayed as a counterfeit exercise of authority precisely because it operates outside this divinely ordered structure of stewardship, in which synodal authority emanates from, and remains in hierarchical communion with, the Pope as the successor of Peter.

1. “21. We believe that the saying of the Lord that Christ addressed to his holy apostles and disciples, Whoever receives you receives me, and whoever despises you despises me, was also addressed to all who were likewise made supreme pontiffs and chief pastors in succession to them in the catholic church. Therefore we declare that no secular powers should treat with disrespect any of those who hold the office of patriarch or seek to move them from their high positions, but rather they should esteem them as worthy of all honour and reverence. This applies in the first place to the most holy pope of old Rome, secondly to the patriarch of Constantinople, and then to the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. Furthermore, nobody else should compose or edit writings or tracts against the most holy pope of old Rome, on the pretext of making incriminating charges, as Photius did recently and Dioscorus a long time ago. Whoever shows such great arrogance and audacity, after the manner of Photius and Dioscorus, and makes false accusations in writing or speech against the see of Peter, the chief of the apostles, let him receive a punishment equal to theirs.
   
   If, then, any ruler or secular authority tries to expel the aforesaid pope of the apostolic see, or any of the other patriarchs, let him be anathema. Furthermore, if a universal synod is held and any question or controversy arises about the holy church of Rome, it should make inquiries with proper reverence and respect about the question raised and should find a profitable solution; it must on no account pronounce sentence rashly against the supreme pontiffs of old Rome.
   (https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum08.htm) ↩︎

Question: Whether the Rosary is Contrary to the Gospel?

Objection 1. It would seem that the Rosary is contrary to the Gospel, for it consists in the repeated recitation of identical prayers. But the Gospel condemns “vain repetitions,” as it is written: “And in praying do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do” (Matt. 6:7). Therefore, the Rosary is opposed to the Gospel.

Objection 2. Further, the Rosary contains a great number of Hail Marys, which far exceed in number the Our Fathers or other prayers. Therefore, it appears to place excessive emphasis on Mary rather than on Christ, thereby detracting from the centrality of the Gospel, which is Christocentric.

Objection 3. Further, the Rosary includes a petition for the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the saints. Yet the Gospel provides no explicit teaching about invoking the intercession of the departed. Therefore, since it introduces a practice foreign to the Gospel, the Rosary is contrary to it.

Sed Contra.

Saint John Paul II calls the Rosary “a compendium of the Gospel.” (Rosarium Virginis Mariae, 18).

I answer that, the Rosary is not contrary to the Gospel, but is rather deeply rooted in it and ordered toward a contemplative assimilation of its central mysteries. For the Rosary begins with the Apostles’ Creed, which is a faithful and efficient summary of the Gospel and of the salvific work of Christ. The subsequent prayers guide the Christian into meditative reflection upon the key mysteries of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, viz. the Joyful, Luminous, Sorrowful, and Glorious Mysteries, which are drawn directly from the Gospel or from truths immediately connected with it.

Moreover, the prayers of the Rosary are themselves evangelical. The Our Father proceeds directly from Christ’s own teaching in the Gospel (Matt. 6:9-13). The Hail Mary opens with the words of the Angel Gabriel and of Elizabeth, both recounted in the Gospel of Luke (Luke 1:28, 42), thus placing the Incarnation, which is the beginning of the Gospel, at the forefront. The doxology (Glory Be) expresses praise of the Holy Trinity, the ultimate source and end of the Gospel economy. Finally, the Fatima prayer engages the soul personally with the redemptive mission accomplished by Christ, imploring salvation in light of the Gospel.

Thus, the Rosary, far from being contrary to the Gospel, is an ordered meditative prayer that leads the faithful more deeply into the mysteries of Christ as proclaimed by the Gospel.

Replies to the Objections

Reply to Objection 1. The Gospel does not condemn repetition as such, but vain repetition, that is, empty or thoughtless babbling. Repetition in prayer is found even in Christ Himself, who “prayed the same words” in Gethsemane (Mark 14:39). The Rosary, however, is not meaningless babble but a focused meditation on the mysteries of salvation, employing repeated prayers as a rhythmic background for contemplation. Therefore, it is not vain repetition.

Reply to Objection 2. It is a fallacy to judge the character of a prayer simply by numerical ratio. Nonetheless, the Hail Mary is exceedingly Christocentric, as it announces the Incarnation (“The Lord is with thee”), fulfills Mary’s prophetic word that “all generations shall call me blessed” (Luke 1:48) by way of invoking her blessings, and culminates in the proclamation of Christ as “the blessed fruit of thy womb.” Moreover, the title Mother of God (Theotokos) is one of the most significant Christological affirmations in the history of the Church (Council of Ephesus), safeguarding the truth of His full divinity as True God. The concluding petition merely seeks her intercession, which is proper to the communion of saints, and not an act of latria. Thus, even the Marian component of the Rosary directs the believer toward Christ.

Reply to Objection 3. The Gospel affirms that the saints are alive in God, as Christ says, “He is not God of the dead, but of the living” (Matt. 22:32). Christ’s parable of the rich man and Lazarus presupposes the ability to intercede among the departed, as the rich man seeks Abraham’s aid (Luke 16:24). Furthermore, Scripture reveals the heavenly intercession of the saints (Rev. 5:8; 8:3-4) and shows a deceased Rachel weeping for her children with God responding to her lament (Jer. 31:15-17). Since the righteous man’s prayer “has great power” (James 5:16), it follows by good and necessary consequence that the intercession of the saints, perfected in glory, is efficacious. Therefore, invoking their intercession harmonizes with the Gospel rather than contradicting it.

R.A. Armstrong offers one of the most careful and thorough treatments of Primary and Secondary Precepts of the Natural Law. After working through various problems in defining and distinguishing Primary and Secondary Precepts, he works through proposals given by St Thomas Aquinas and various contemporary writers on whether and why secondary precepts may be subject to variability. Is it due to our passions, advances in understanding, the distinction between positive and negative precepts, etc. Armstrong concludes, “in certain instances, brought about by a reorientation in the structure of society, it would be possible to say that an action which was at one time in genuine accordance with natural law, might to-day be regarded as contrary to natural law” (185).

Armstrong cites Fuchs, and develops his line of reasoning about historicity and the being of man. There are invariable aspects of our humanity, but other aspects are relative to our surrounding currcumstances, e.g. the structure of the society one finds oneself in. To this, Armstrong provides an example of just war, and submits that the innovation of nuclear weapons have authentically generated variability in the secondary precepts related to when participation in war would accord with natural law. He writes, “…since the discovery of the hydrogen bomb with its potential for almost total destruction, it is difficult to conceive of the participation in any war as being in conformity with natural law. Here we see an instance of what could best be described as a change in the intrinsic structure of society, brought about by the arrival of nuclear weapons. The nature of society has undergone a change, and it is this change which allows us to assert that while the participation in war in the past could have been regarded as being in conformity with natural law, such participation to-day would have to be considered as contrary to natural law.” (178-179).

Armstrong is tentative and suggests more research is needed in this area. I submit that my own argument is in conformity with his observation, i.e. that certain technologies can generate such variability with respect to the intrinsic nature of the society within which we find ourselves. This has been the task of the papal magisterium who must deliberate on bio-medical technologies that allow us to separate the natural ends of, say, the marital act. Other examples may be given there, I am sure. Today, we find a magisterium that teaches a variability in the secondary precept pertaining to retributive justice and capital punishment, again, owing to technology, i.e. the ability to secure public safety through a more secure penal system, and to rehabilitate with superior psychiatric medicines and psychological therapies.

Given this, I see the “incompatibility” thesis, the thesis that the papal magisterium today is in contradiction with prior infallible teaching, as facing the insuperable difficulty of arguing that such variability cannot exist in the secondary precepts, or that no specifying circumstances have (or even could) obtain which alter the material nature of state killing, or that the primary end of capital punishment is, in fact, separable from its secondary ends in capital punishment.

It does not suffice to merely assert one’s personal beliefs about capital punishment, ie that personally one believes the ends are separable or that personally one does not think the technology has resulted in such variability. This would only demonstrate an incompatibility between one’s own views and that of the magisterium. By analogy it would be like rejecting HV and holding to the seperability of the procreative and unitive ends of the marital act, thus insisting that intercourse while contracepting is an instance of the marital act merely because it is unitive, or that artificial insemination is an instance of the marital act merely because it is procreative. This only shows a rejection of papal teaching, not a reductio of the teaching itself. To show incompatibility in the Catholic Magisterium, it must be shown that the contemporary popes cannot hold to this variability without plainly contradicting natural law itself, or designations about the invariability of capital punishment by which the act might be subject to specifying circumstances.

Put simply, incompatibilists, like Edward Feser, are offering us a philosophical opinion on natural law that leads them to view the current magisterium as incompatible with prior teaching, rather than an authentic development from it (as the magisterium itself insists and maintains). That opinion, though, cannot hold sway over a Catholic’s obligation to submit intellect and will to the pope.

Armstrong, R. (2012). Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching. Netherlands: Springer Netherlands.

1. Reunification between the Catholic and other Apostolic Churches ought to occur.

Justification: Christ prayed for visible ecclesial unity (“that they may all be one” – John 17:21), and the Church is confessed as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. Disunity is a scandal and contradicts the will of Christ Therefore, reunion is a moral and theological imperative.

2. If something ought to occur, then it must be possible. (Ought implies can)

Justification: A fundamental moral principle: no one can be obligated to do the impossible (Kant). Divine precepts presuppose the possibility of their fulfillment. Since Christ commands unity, unity must be possible.

∴ 3. Reunification is possible.

Follows by modus ponens from (1) and (2).

4. Reunification is possible only if Catholic magisterial authority is true.

Justification: On the assumption that there is no functioning ecclesiological mechanism (no pope, no ecumenical council, no magisterial subject) capable of effecting or ratifying reunion, it would be impossible for the Churches to ever unite. Thus, if Catholic magisterial authority is false, reunification is impossible. By contraposition: if reunification is possible, then Catholic magisterial authority must be true, because only Catholicism retains a living authority with the power to bind and to loose, to lift censures, and to reconcile the Church.

∴ 5. Catholic magisterial authority is true.

Follows by modus ponens from (3) and (4).

Ten Significant Implications:

1. Immortality of the Soul (Line 2)
2. Christ as Divine Shepherd, i.e. an early high Christology (Lines 3–5)
3. Authority of Scripture (Line 6)
4. Importance and Royal Status of the Church of Rome (Lines 7–8)
5. Baptism as Ontological Transformation (Line 9)
6. Catholicity of the Church (Lines 10–11)
7. Pauline Communion/Continuity or Spiritual Companionship (Line 12)
8. Christ as Eucharistic Fish (Lines 13–14)
9. Eucharistic Real Presence with the elements of bread and wine (Lines 15–16)
10. Prayer for the Dead (Lines 17–19)

The Epitaph of Abercius–2nd Century Christian Inscription (text from Grabka 1996):

1 The citizen of an eminent city, this monument I made
2 whilst still living, that there I might have in time a resting place for my body.
3 My name is Abercius, the disciple of the holy shepherd
4 who feeds his flocks of sheep on the mountains and in the plains,
5 who has great eyes that see everywhere.
6 This shepherd taught me the Book worthy of belief.
7 It is he who sent me to Rome to behold the royal majesty
8 and to see the queen arrayed in golden vestments and golden sandals.
9 There also I saw the people famous for their seal.
10 And I saw the plains of Syria and all its cities, and also Nisibis
11 when I crossed the Euphrates. Everywhere I met brethren in agreement,
12 having Paul [as my companion].[4] Everywhere faith was my guide
13 and everywhere provided as my food the Fish
14 of exceeding great size and pure whom the spotless virgin caught from the spring.
15 And faith ever gives this food to his disciples to eat,
16 having the choicest wine and administering the mixed drink with bread.
17 I, Abercius, standing by, ordered these words to be inscribed,
18 being in the course of my seventy second year.
19 Let him who understands these words and believes the same pray for Abercius.
20 No one shall place another tomb over my grave;
21 but if he do so, he shall pay to the treasury of the Romans two thousand pieces of gold
22 and to my beloved native city Hieropolis, one thousand pieces of gold.

My Analysis:

-Line 2: Suggests a belief that the soul separates from the body, indicating an early Christian belief in the immortality of the soul, especially given line 19, where those who understand the esoteric meaning are asked to interceed for him in prayer.
-Lines 3-5: The Holy Shepherd is likely Christ, cf. John 10:11-16, Ezekiel 34:13-15). The phrase “great eyes that see everywhere” is rarely applied to the Good Shepherd, “…except as the cosmic Logos” (Knox 1942, 72). Thus, this suggests an early belief in the omniscience and so divinity of Christ, the Good Shepherd.
-Line 6 The Book worthy of belief is likely the Scriptures.
-Lines 7-8 Rome is described in royal terms. “Abercius claims to have seen at Rome ‘a Queen (basilissa) with golden robes and golden shoes’. Beyond doubt the phrase is a metaphorical description of the ecumenical Christian church.” (Peter Thonemann 2012, pg 260). This indicates the importance of the Church of Rome (Leclercq 1907).
-Line 9: This is similar to the language of Clement of Alexandria, who describes baptism as a “seal” and causing “illumination” (Ferguson 2009, 311-312). Thus, this is more sacramental than symbolic in that there appears a lasting ontological effect.
-Lines 10-11: Other churches to which Abercius made pilgrimage were “bretheran in agreement”, which suggests catholicity.
-Line 12: To have Paul as companion could be spiritual or as in his epistles (Paton 1906, 94). Others suggest that this is an allusion to Paul’s missionary journey, nonetheless, the language of having Paul, who is in heaven, is an interesting claim of continuity and Apostolicity.
-Line 13-14: The “Fish” is likely a reference to ΙΧΘΥΣ, i.e. to Christ, who is the food of the believers. Some interpret the “spotless virgin” to be the Virgin Mary, and the catching of the fish as an allusion to the conception of Christ. (“Abercius, Epitaph of”). Others say it is the Church (see Paton 1906 for a discussion)
-Lines 15-16: Faith gives this food, i.e. the Fish or Christ, to His disciples to eat, along with mixed wine and bread, i.e. the Eucharistic elements ( Leclercq 1907). That the fish is consumed with wine and bread indicates a belief in the Real Presence.
-Line 17-19: Indicates that this is composed by Abercius who died in AD167, placing the inscription before his death. The petition to pray for him, is a clear indication of the practice of praying for the repose of the dead.

References:

1. “Abercius, Epitaph of .” New Catholic Encyclopedia. . Retrieved June 17, 2025 from Encyclopedia.com: https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/abercius-epitaph
2. Ferguson, E. (2009). Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five Centuries. United Kingdom: Eerdmans Publishing Company.
3. Grabka, G. (1996.). Eucharistic belief manifest in the epitaphs of Abercius and Pectorius. EWTN Catholicism Library. Retrieved July 8, 2025, from https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/eucharistic-belief-manifest-in-the-epitaphs-of-abercius-and-pectorius-12509
4. Knox, W. L. (1944). Some Hellenistic elements in primitive Christianity: The Schweich Lectures 1942. Oxford University Press.
5. Leclercq, H. (1907). Inscription of Abercius. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01040a.htm
6. Paton, W. R. (1906). NOTE ON THE INSCRIPTION OF ABERCIUS. Revue Archéologique, 8, 93–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41747219

If there is a counterfeit Mona Lisa, there is the real one. If there are counterfeit US dollars, there are real US dollars. We shall generalize this and call it the “Counterfeit Dependence” principle, i.e. all counterfeits imply the existence of some reality upon which they are based.

We can apply this principle to the question of whether there is a real Mass, i.e. a real liturgy in which Christ’s sacrifice is offered to the Father.

Let

Cx ≝ x is counterfeit
Mx ≝ x is a Mass
Rx ≝ x is real
A(x,P) ≝ x appears to be a P-like thing
Bxy ≝ x is based upon y

1. (∀x)(∀P){[Cx ∧ A(x,P)] → (∃y)[(Ry ∧ Py) ∧ Bxy]} (“Counterfeit Dependence” premise)
2. (∃x)(Cx ∧ A(x,M) (premise)
3. Cμ ∧ A(μ,M) (2 EI)
4. (∀P){[Cμ ∧ A(μ,P)] → (∃y)[(Ry ∧ Py) ∧ Bμy]} (1 UI)
5. [Cμ ∧ A(μ,M)] → (∃y)[(Ry ∧ My) ∧ Bμy] (4 UI)
6. (∃y)[(Ry ∧ My) ∧ Bμy](2,5 MP)
7. (Rν ∧ Mν) ∧ Bμν (6 EI)
8. (Rν ∧ Mν) (7 Simp)
9. (∃x)(Rx ∧ Mx) (8 EG)

If there is a counterfeit “Mass”, there is a real Mass. Since there are such counterfeits, there is a real Mass.
QED
See also: https://vexingquestions.wordpress.com/2014/08/24/the-sacred-and-the-sacrilegious-the-real-presence-and-a-black-mass/