Showing posts with label rape. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rape. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 15, 2023

Forcing Child Rape Victims To Give Birth Is Exactly What the Dobbs Justices Hoped Would Happen



This is a picture of a twelve-year old girl.


(I assume. It's from an article titled "Awesome Things About Raising 12 Year Olds." For obvious reasons I didn't want to spend too much time Google Image searching "12 year old girl").

This is an article about a different twelve year old girl.

Ashley just had a baby. She’s sitting on the couch in a relative’s apartment in Clarksdale, Miss., wearing camo-print leggings and fiddling with the plastic hospital bracelets still on her wrists. It’s August and pushing 90 degrees, which means the brown patterned curtains are drawn, the air conditioner is on high, and the room feels like a hiding place. Peanut, the baby boy she delivered two days earlier, is asleep in a car seat at her feet, dressed in a little blue outfit. Ashley is surrounded by family, but nobody is smiling. One relative silently eats lunch in the kitchen, her two siblings stare glumly at their phones, and her mother, Regina, watches from across the room. Ashley was discharged from the hospital only hours ago, but there are no baby presents or toys in the room, no visible diapers or ointments or bottles. Almost nobody knows that Peanut exists, because almost nobody knew that Ashley was pregnant. She is 13 years old. Soon she’ll start seventh grade.

In the fall of 2022, Ashley was raped by a stranger in the yard outside her home, her mother says. For weeks, she didn’t tell anybody what happened, not even her mom....

[Ashley's mother] Regina tentatively asked [Dr.] Balthrop if there was any way to terminate Ashley’s pregnancy. Seven months earlier, Balthrop could have directed Ashley to abortion clinics in Memphis, 90 minutes north, or in Jackson, Miss., two and a half hours south. But today, Ashley lives in the heart of abortion-ban America.... Within weeks [of the Dobbs decision], Mississippi and every state that borders it banned abortion in almost all circumstances.

Balthrop told Regina that the closest abortion provider for Ashley would be in Chicago. At first, Regina thought she and Ashley could drive there. But it’s a nine-hour trip, and Regina would have to take off work. She’d have to pay for gas, food, and a place to stay for a couple of nights, not to mention the cost of the abortion itself. “I don’t have the funds for all this,” she says. 

So Ashley did what girls with no other options do: she did nothing. 

It bears repeating what Scott Lemieux said: the very consistent Republican position on cases like Ashley's is that states should have more latitude to force child rape victims to give birth compared to the average women (and they very much believe the average women shouldn't have much in the way of rights either). Ashley's situation isn't a case of unintended consequences; it's the Dobbs ruling doing exactly what its proponents intended and wanted it to do.

Wednesday, May 24, 2023

F-ing Banned Roundup

 Ron DeSantis' botched campaign rollout includes the following hats.



Anyway, my browser needs clearing, so today you get a roundup.

* * *

Texas Republicans set up a bespoke center at the University of Texas to promote a conservative ideological vision. Texas Republicans also look set to wreck tenure. Turns out the latter poses a recruitment problem for the former.

The Fourth Circuit upholds race-neutral admissions standards at Thomas Jefferson High School in Virginia against a challenge that they discriminate against Asian-American applicants. Ilya Somin objects here; I may have my own comments later.

Now that he's running, JTA runs down all the Jewish things you need to know about Ron DeSantis. He loves Israel. Also, his campaign against wokeness has resulted in banning books on the Holocaust, and neo-Nazis are flocking to the state.

Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) admits she "struggles" with the idea of removing Israeli settlers from the West Bank, suggests they have the right to stay where they are. I've said it before and I'll say it again; one need not like or even fully credit Tlaib's putative commitment to "one state with equal rights for all" to admit that it's clearly better than the many, many politicians whose position is "one state that does not even pretend to provide equal rights for all."


Texas forces a woman with an unviable pregnancy to stay in the hospital until she gives birth to her stillborn fetus (or becomes sick enough to potentially die) by threatening her with criminal prosecution if she tries to leave.

If we don't raise the debt ceiling, it seems we have to triage who gets paid. I've seen many proposals on how to do this. But Kevin Drum raises the possibility that our treasury system isn't built to allow for any "choosing", and so we'd be forced to basically just arbitrarily pay whoever comes to the door first.

Wednesday, May 10, 2023

Enough With The Horse Racing

No, this isn't about the Kentucky Derby. This is about the jury that just found that former President Donald Trump sexually abused and defamed E. Jean Carroll. The jury did not find that Trump raped Carroll.

Shakezula found a particularly egregious example of a common media response to this ruling, and indeed, this entire lawsuit: framing it entirely in terms of the impact on Trump's political future. Will it hurt him? Help him? All be a wash?

How's this for a comment: it doesn't matter. I mean, obviously, it should matter in the sense that "a man whom a federal jury just found is a sexual predator and liar should have no political future, and it's appalling if that isn't the case." But beyond that, the idea that political calculations should play an iota of a role in terms of whether this case should have been brought, or how we respond to it, should appall us all.

The simple truth of that matter is that if E. Jean Carroll was sexually abused by Donald Trump, and then defamed by him, she deserved justice. A jury found that Trump did both of those things, and has now awarded her some measure of compensation and vindication. If it redounds to Trump's political advantage, it was worth it. If it redounds to Democrats' political advantage, it was also worth it. The political implications mean absolutely nothing in the face of ensuring that Ms. Carroll received the due a jury of her peers determined she was owed for being preyed upon by Trump. That's all there is to it.

Saturday, May 06, 2023

In Shocking Twist, Republicans Consider Expelling Legislator For Actual Misconduct

We're all by now familiar with the scandals in Tennessee and Montana, where Republican-controlled legislatures sought to expel or otherwise silence Democratic colleagues for the crimes of having opinions while Black and trans (respectively). Now there's news of another proposed expulsion coming from a red state -- but in a shocking twist, Republicans are experimenting with using it to address actual misconduct!

A House committee has recommended the expulsion of Republican state Rep. Bryan Slaton after finding he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with an aide, then acted to thwart an investigation into the matter.

A scathing report by the House General Investigating Committee, distributed to House shortly after noon Saturday, found Slaton did not dispute allegations that he had sex with the 19-year-old woman and provided alcohol to her, nor did he express regret or remorse for his conduct. Instead, the report said, Slaton’s lawyer argued the complaints should be dismissed because the behavior occurred in Slaton’s Austin residence, not the workplace.

That summary barely scratches the surface -- the report strongly suggests that Rep. Slaton raped his aide (the aide was reportedly sufficiently intoxicated that she "could not effectively consent to intercourse and could not indicate whether [Slaton’s conduct] was welcome or unwelcome" -- the word for that is rape) and then threatened her (showing her a message reading "nothing would happen as long as her and her friends keep quiet").

Rep. Slaton entered office after ousting a more moderate Republican with backing from a pair of far-right petro billionaires. And what was his signature issue? You'll absolutely guess:

Last year, he called for a blanket ban on minors at drag shows, saying it was necessary to protect children from “perverted adults.”

Of course.

Anyway, kudos to Texas Republicans for considering using expulsion as a tool to punish actual misconduct as opposed to as a political stunt to disenfranchise minorities.

Friday, March 31, 2023

"Why Some Men Are Above the Law"

In 2016, the eminent philosopher Martha Nussbaum publicly recounted for (I believe) the first time her "Bill Cosby" story -- not about Cosby, but about her being raped by a different famous "TV dad" in the late 1960s. The title of the story was "Why Some Men Are Above the Law", and Nussbaum takes little time to address the myriad reasons why she never did report the attack until some fifty years later. 

One obvious reason for her reticence, Nussbaum noted, was the near-certainty that her attacker would "either to portray me as an extortionist or to sue me for defamation." On this point, Nussbaum said something -- in a parenthetical aside no less! -- that I've found myself returning to year after year:
(The famous are indeed unusually exposed to extortion, and that vulnerability itself is an aspect of their impunity: everyone easily believes that this is what a complaining woman is after.)

This is something I've turned over and over in my head. The famous are exposed to extortion; that is the reality. It is a true vulnerability; it isn't made up. And yet that vulnerability becomes itself a form of impunity: because it's always so obviously possible for them to be accused in bad faith, any accusation immediately falls under a shadow of suspicion.

I thought of this again today, when it was announced that a different television personality would be indicted for various crimes by the state of New York. Donald Trump's defenders have quickly raised hue and cry over this being a political witch hunt, dirty politics, a partisan plot (this, of course, does not even get into the de rigueur allegation that it's a Soros-led plot). I heard it said that Barack Obama will be the last president not to be indicted upon leaving office, as surely this is the new normal in tit-for-tat partisan squabbling.

The thing is, the critics have an inkling of a point. Donald Trump, by his station, is more vulnerable than the average Joe to being targeted in a political prosecution. The prospect of partisan motivations does loom larger. But that vulnerability is part of the impunity; the fact that this specter can never quite be dispelled is ultimately what has let Trump run riot over the civil and criminal laws of this country for years. No matter what he does or how brazen he gets, we'll always have to (rightfully!) second-guess whether we're letting politics overcome law -- far more so than in a standard criminal case.  It is the same ultimate story that Nussbaum told. And for too long, it has let Donald Trump stand above the law.

Thursday, July 14, 2022

The Default Conservative Response to Inconvenient Facts is to Cry "Liar!"

Many of you have probably been following the horrific story of a ten-year old rape victim from Ohio who was forced to travel to Indiana to have an abortion following her home state's criminalization of the procedure.

No doubt some of you witnessed a collective right-wing response to the story, which was simply to declare it a lie. The Wall Street Journal editorial board called the story "too good to confirm". Ohio Rep. Jim Jordan (R) called it "another lie". National Review contributor Michael Brendan Dougherty called it a "fictive abortion and a fictive rape." Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost suggested the story was a fabrication because he hadn't heard a "whisper" about such a rape case from local law enforcement officials. It was everywhere.

Then the story was (further) confirmed, and those who called it a lie retreated with various amounts of egg on their face. Which is to say, they mostly said they were right to assume the story was made up even though it wasn't.

This has been the main meta-media response to the controversy: agreeing that there were "red flags" about the story such as its "weird timing" that meant we should all have taken very seriously the collective right-wing declaration that the story was a hoax, even though it turns out to have been horrifyingly true.

There were no significant "red flags" here. It is not suspicious that the Indianapolis Star did not publish the name, address, photograph, and social security number of a minor rape victim. It is not "weird" that stories of the horrible consequences of criminalizing abortion would begin to emerge shortly after abortion was criminalized. Obviously, if there is actual evidence of malfeasance or fabrication, one should look into that. But that wasn't present here.*

No, what happened here is very straightforward: A story was published that constituted an inconvenient fact for conservatives. So they declared it to be a lie. That's it. That's all that prompted the reaction. No "red flags", no "reasonable grounds to question". The story was inconvenient, and the response was to cry "liar!"

If we had to do meta-coverage of this story, that's what should have been the frame. It is, after all, the same basic instinct that motivated the cries that the 2020 election was "stolen". What prompted those cries was not any "evidence" or "suspicions" or "red flags". Biden winning was an inconvenient fact, and the default right-wing response to an inconvenient fact is to declare it a lie. Same reason why January 6 insurrectionists are declared to be "antifa". Same reason why mass shootings are alleged to be false flags. Same thing for global warming, same thing for whether Israeli soldiers shot Shireen Abu Aqleh, same thing for Trump's connections with Russia. This is not something occurring in isolation. It is a pattern of behavior, and a deeply dangerous one at that. It's always a lie, it's always "fake news".

So if the media wanted to soul-search its coverage, it should start there. What does it mean that conservatives now reflexively and instinctively declare any story that troubles their ideological waters to be a lie, and what does it mean that the media still views those cries as having credence?

This response, after all, is toxic to the proper functioning of democratic politics. Yet rather than identify it for what it is, let alone push back on it, the media aids and abets it with thumb-sucking self-abnegations agreeing "questions were raised." No they weren't! The mere fact that Republicans don't like a given fact or event or story about the world is not and should not be enough for the media to agree that its truth is up for dispute.

So that's the story I want to see. I want a deep dive into how conservatives have begun calling any inconvenient fact a lie. I want a clear and unvarnished explication of the pattern of behavior, contextualizing the most recent instance by reference to other prominent cases where they've run that same playbook. I want comments from self-reflective journalists about why these unevidenced cries of "liar" are given credence, and whether it is appropriate to continue to give credence to those cries going forward.

That's the metastory. Someone should get on it.

Oh, and for those of you wondering: now that the story has been fully confirmed, conservatives are sweeping into action ... by launching a criminal investigation of the doctor who cared for the child and proposing legislation that would criminalizing giving the child an abortion in Indiana. Because the current Republican orthodoxy is that adolescent rape victims should have to give birth or die trying.

* The closest exception I'll cop to is the Ohio Attorney General saying he hadn't heard of such a case, with the strong implication that if the case existed he would have known about it. But since it turned out there was such a case, the proper response for the media going forward is to treat Attorney General Yost as presumptively uncredible unless proven otherwise. Of course, the actual response will be to continue to treat uncorroborated declarations by Yost as rock-hard proof, while spinning in circles to explain why a doctor going on the record about an event they have first-hand knowledge about is too flimsy to take seriously.

Thursday, October 04, 2018

Why I Feel Bad Roundup

Are you watching "I Feel Bad"? I'm excited for it -- not the least because it features British-Indian-Israeli-Jewish actor Brian George. The conceit of the show is Sarayu Blue's character going through all the things in her daily life that make her feel bad (like "I'm turning into my mother"). So in honor of that, here are some of things in my life making me feel bad!

* * *

If the Ben Wittes who wrote that bracing Atlantic article explaining why, even though he knows and respects Brett Kavanaugh, he couldn't vote to confirm him was possessed by a demon, he'd have written this Eli Steinberg article on why, despite (in the very barest possible sense) "believing" Ford he still thinks the only way to "return to normal" and "get[] politics out of the pursuit of justice" is to vote to confirm.

Iran's Supreme Leader uses clips of Aly Raisman, among others, to argue that if women dressed more modestly (namely, wore a hijab) they wouldn't be sexually assaulted. That sound you hear is Raisman preparing to break another world record, this time for longest and loudest continuous cussing out of a single human being.

The Canary Mission -- the "pro-Israel" blacklisting site of (mostly young) people who are too-associated with BDS or Palestinian solidarity politics (read my extended thoughts on them here) has very closely guarded its funding sources. But the Forward found one of the donors -- and it's the San Francisco Jewish Federation. (Why I feel slightly better: the Federation concluded that it's funding guidelines were violated and promised not to allow such donations in the future)

More Canary! Here's a Zionist professor noting that he appears on the Canary blacklist despite opposing BDS, simply because he's also opposed certain proposed legal anti-BDS countermeasures (I wonder if I'm on there too?).

An American student of Palestinian ancestry was blocked from entering Israel to study at Hebrew University. Shades of the Michigan letter of recommendation case, except obviously 98% of people are scrambling to invert their position 180 degrees. Oh, and the Israeli ministry that excluded the student (who obtained a visa from the American Israeli consulate in Miami)? It apparently relied on reporting from ... you guessed it: Canary!

Jonathan Cohn reports on one of those annoying political realities that makes academics' and wonks' heads hurt: Bernie Sanders' "Stop BEZOS" bill was both utterly idiotic as policy, and yet likely responsible (in substantial part, at least) for Amazon's announced $15 minimum wage. It's not just "bad policy = good politics". It's that "promoting bad policies is good politics that sometimes can grease the path to good policies"! For anyone who cares both about good political and policy outcomes and really doesn't want to be a hack, that's a recipe for a big ol' frown-y face.

Tuesday, January 23, 2018

West on Sex, Law, and Consent

I just wanted to flag this outstanding essay by Georgetown Law Professor Robin West: "Sex, Law, and Consent" (published in The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer, eds.). It's about a decade old now, but it is incredibly resonant with ongoing debates, and deserves to be recirculated.

The thrust of the piece is a defense of "consent" as a demarcation between criminal and non-criminal sexual acts, coupled with a critique of "consent" as automatically delineating the difference between "good" (non-harmful, valorous, laudatory) and "bad" sex.  West's argument is framed as a critique of certain radical feminist and queer theorists who have attacked the importance of consent -- either because it understates the background coercive conditions and inequalities of power which often render "consent" constructed or empty (RadFem) or because it nullifies the radical transgressive power of sexuality which is hot precisely because it plays upon these inequalities of power (queer theoretics).

West suggests that both of these critiques are ill-advised because they don't take sufficient account of the subjective experience of harm that is distinctive to nonconsensual sex (i.e., rape). There is, West suggests, a difference between agreeing to an exploitative contract and being robbed -- both might be problems, and the former may actually in aggregate contribute more to the broader spectrum of injustice than the latter, but nonetheless the subjective experience of signing a contract under exploitative conditions is not the same as being held up at gunpoint, and people don't experience it as such, and people don't expect the state to respond to them in the same way. The way we stop exploitative contracting isn't by expanding the definition of theft and robbery to encompass it. That they both represent wrongs doesn't mean they should be collapsed into the same category of social injustice.

Yet at the same time, West argues, that sex may be consensual (and therefore, in her view, not properly subjected to criminal sanction) should not exhaust our moral vocabulary when speaking of sex. Sex can be fully consensual and yet still harmful. Sex can be fully consensual and desired and yet still harmful. Ironically, we're more likely to speak of the harms of consensual sex in the case where it is mutually desired, as when we're lecturing a teenager that sure, they might want to have sex, but there's always the risk of an unexpected pregnancy or a disease that can derail a promising career or trap one in a life trajectory one very much does not desire. Yet this all obscures a different but still important case of consensual but undesired sex. Even here, West is appropriately circumspect -- we consent to things we don't desire all the time (West gives the example of consenting to see a movie one does not actually wish to see, because one's partner or children wish to). This isn't necessarily a terrible thing in isolation, but it can be, if it becomes pervasive or occupies the entirety of one's sexual being (if one's entire life of movie-watching is one that is wholly about what others desire, with no regard to what you yourself would like to see, that's a pretty crappy cinematic life irrespective of whether all the choices are "consensual"). In those cases, one is being harmed in a very real way -- internalizing (as West points out, quite literally) the notion that one's body is solely for others pleasure and that one's own desires are immaterial -- even though it's also a very distinctive way from that which comes through nonconsensual sex.

The point, then, is to avoid the Charybdis of calling it all rape, because consent is an effectively meaningless concept (or, on the other side, all sexy transgressive power play because consent is a fictive projection of repressed sexual desire) and the Scylla of saying that none of it matters because it was all consensual. As we move from the unambiguously criminal actions of a Harvey Weinstein to the more complex case of an Aziz Ansari, the failure to make these distinctions becomes more and more of an obstacle to pushing the conversation forward. People read about the Ansari case and say "you want to throw him in jail for that?" or "was it really non-consensual?" But that's a product of a crimped imagination whereby a broad range of moral questions get collapsed into a legal (criminal) question which gets collapsed into a "consensual" question -- and there's much more to be said than that. What happened to Grace, in her telling, may not be something that should result in Ansari being incarcerated, but it also isn't the equivalent of Grace agreeing to see a movie she has no interest in because her partner wants to watch it (let alone the equivalent of an actively desired encounter which, in the aftermath, turns out to have negative consequences).

Anyway, when I started writing this post I meant it to be a single paragraph of consisting of "read West's essay", and I've gone on much longer than that. So I'll just let it rest here -- but you should definitely read her piece.

Monday, October 23, 2017

On Zionism, Anti-Zionism, Gender Violence, and Power

Last week, a post by Mahroh Jahangiri on the popular feminist blog Feministing lumped in "Zionism" with "racism, colonialism, [and] militarism" as part of the "systems of violence ... built to uphold white supremacy" which create "gender-based violence."

Unsurprisingly, many in the Jewish community were sharply critical. Feministing stood by its author, tweeting at its followers to "read this on #MeToo, racism, & Zionism."

If you read the post in question, this is a strange tweet. It's strange because the post is not actually "on" Zionism in any meaningful respect. By that, I don't mean that it presents a false, or caricatured, or strawman version of Zionism. I mean that the only mention of Zionism at all in the post comes as follows:
Though this should be obvious, in this moment it bears repeating: gender-based violence does not exist without other systems of violence, especially those built to uphold white supremacy (such as racism, colonialism, zionism, militarism). 
Zionism appears as a parenthetical aside, and other than that goes unmentioned (there's a similar, parenthetical inclusion of Israel later on). So what is going on here? (Warning: This post is lengthy).

I.

Framed as it was, Jahangiri's parenthetical operates less as an argument "on" Zionism than it does a presupposition. It seeks to smuggle in as a presumption several assertions about Zionism that are -- to say the least -- seriously contested and problematic, such as that it is "built to uphold white supremacy", that it is of familial resemblance to racism and colonialism, and that it is implicated in creating gender-based violence.

In an excellent new essay on "blocking" (a concept I'll return to in a moment), feminist philosopher Rae Langton discusses the sometimes insidious role of presuppositions as a discursive move. Consider the statement "That pitcher throws like a girl!" Most directly, it is saying "that pitcher throws poorly," and we might agree or disagree with the statement. But it also presupposes a few things -- that there is a way to throw "like a girl", and that throwing "like a girl" is a bad thing. Notice that even if you disagree with the statement -- "no, the pitcher doesn't 'throw like a girl'" -- one does not automatically or naturally contest the presuppositions.

One thing presuppositions can do, then, is they can smuggle in content as shared presumptions without directly justifying it or opening to critique, in contexts where the content might otherwise be far more vulnerable to challenge. The person who, if asked directly, would sharply deny that girls are necessarily bad athletes or throw pitches in a distinctively bad way, may well casually nod if his friend says "that pitcher throws like a girl."

"Blocking" disrupts such presuppositions. If someone says "even George could win the race," that "even" presupposes that George is an unlikely candidate to win (and again, note how nodding or shaking one's head wouldn't naturally be read as contesting the "even" part). If one responds instead by saying "whaddya mean, 'even'?", then one has blocked the presupposition. Of course, it still can be argued for as an assertion -- one may well have perfectly good reasons why George is a long-shot -- but that places the discussion on a very different terrain from when it was presupposed.

To be presupposed is a nice place to reside, if you can get there. It takes your position out of the rough-and-tumble of contestation, and into the nice, comfortable space of shared background assumptions. If someone challenges a presupposition, they automatically come off as a sort of spoil-sport or nitpicker -- the type of person who insists that you justify every god-damned thing (what kind of fanatic invests this much effort over a parenthetical?). Presupposition, hence, isn't just a description, it's also a move -- a tactical effort to place a particular position on the status-quo high ground and implicitly disadvantage efforts to dislodge it from its perch.

Reading Jahangiri's relevant passage clearly is written to present substantive views about Zionism as presuppositions that need not be argued. The structure -- a parenthetical aside, basically a throw-away, casually given to add a bit of illustrative flair -- is not one you use when you know (or want to admit) that you are making a contestable point. To demonstrate, imagine her parenthetical read as follows:
especially those built to uphold white supremacy (such as racism, colonialism, zionism, militarism, cubism).
The reader there would probably pull up short: "Hold it -- why 'cubism'?" And anyone familiar with Jewish humor knows the ensuing retort: "Why 'zionism'?"

The critical response to Jahangiri, then, is an attempt to block a back-door attempt to smuggle in presuppositions about Zionism. Feministing's after-the-fact attempt to say that the post was "on" Zionism is disingenuous, it seeks to recharacterize as an argument what was actually an attempt at rhetorical fiat. That the fiat could even plausibly work for Zionism (in a way it couldn't for "cubism") itself shows that the dimensions of power in this context are not necessarily what they're always perceived to be.

Of course, there is still much to be said about the argument as an argument. And here I might surprise some of my readers when I say that there is a valid and important connection to be made between Zionism and gender violence. However, that connection isn't what Jahangiri presents it as, and once again her discursive framing seeks to presuppose an array of incorrect (and often quite damaging) assertions about Zionism vis-a-vis other social practices that do more to obscure than they do illuminate the issue.

II.

"Wherever there is a position of power," Olympic gymnast McKayla Maroney wrote, "there seems to be potential for abuse." And since Zionism is, in some places, a position of power, then there is the potential for Zionism to construct and buttress gender violence.

Framed that way, this may sound unremarkable precisely because it applies so universally. Hollywood is, in some places, a position of power, and therefore in some places constructs and buttresses gender violence. Socialism is, in some places, a position of power, and therefore in some places constructs and buttresses gender violence. Evangelicalism is, in some places, a position of power, and therefore in some places constructs and buttresses gender violence.

Gender violence follows power, and power, as Foucault reminds is, is ubiquitous. Hence, gender violence is also ubiquitous. There is no space where one is free from power, and so there is no place where power can't be corrupted and turned towards gender-based violence and oppression.

And to be crystal-clear on the matter: there is nothing that exempts "left" or "progressive" spaces from these risks. From Black Panthers to Bernie Bros, progressive organizations and movements have never been remotely exempt from dynamics of gender violence. Franz Fanon speaks of women who "ask to be raped," in the same way that there are "faces that ask to be slapped." The "Comrade Delta" affair in the Socialist Workers Party is another example. Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz's writings on gender violence in lesbian communities provide another. Power, of a particular kind, circulates in these communities too, and that power can and is leveraged to enact sexual violence.

We might think that this universalism, this ubiquity, itself makes it wrong to speak of the link between Zionism and gender violence because its not saying anything unique. "Yes," it might be conceded, "Zionism is linked to gender violence because all social practices are. But that makes the decision to particularly focus on Zionism more suspect, not less, since it implies that there is something distinctive about Zionism that actually is common to virtually any social phenomenon."

Yet this argument is wrong. Power is not an undifferentiated thing; that power is everywhere doesn't mean it operates the same everywhere. Gender violence operates through power, which means it will predictably adopt the idioms, pathways, and mechanics opened up by power. And because these will differ from position to position, there need to be particular discourses about sexual violence that are particular to specific arenas or dimensions of power.

How, for example, does gender violence act upon power in "repressive," Victorian communities? Well, it sharply delineates who are good (pure, chaste, virginal) girls and who are bad (classless, promiscuous, available) girls; or it tells women that sexuality is a duty owed to their husband (whose identity they've merged into, so no such thing as marital rape). In another community -- the "liberated" community of the sexual revolution -- power interacts with gender violence differently. Now it's about showing that you're not a prude or a square, that you're hip and with it, that you don't have hang-ups -- all of these, too, are easily leveraged for the purposes of sexual abuse, but clearly they're different and need a different narrative from the discourse we'd apply to Victorian sexual predation. To speak of power and gender violence as an undifferentiated whole would almost certainly obscure how it specifically plays out in one context or the other, and most likely both.

For that reason, we should expect that -- in places where Zionism is powerful, gender violence will play out in distinctively "Zionist" ways. It will "speak the language", if you will; it will have a character distinctive to the arena(s) of power it operates within. The activities of Lehava -- the far-right "anti-assimilationist" group which threatens Jewish/Arab interrelations -- is an obvious example of gender oppression shock troops acting through an explicitly Zionist lens (that 15 of their members -- including their head -- were just arrested likewise demonstrates that "Zionism" contains more than just this chord).

So I do think that it is important to work through the interrelation of Zionism and gender violence in a distinctive way. However, I think this is important for the same reason why it's important to work through the interrelation of anti-Zionism and gender violence in a distinctive way. Just as Zionism is, in some places, a position of power and thereby constructs a distinctive forms of gender violence, in other places anti-Zionism occupies a position of power and it, too, buttresses its own versions of sexual oppression.

It's worth noticing how Jahangiri's parenthetical -- placing "zionism" alongside things like "colonialism" or "racism" -- presupposes this potentiality away. Just as adding "cubism" to the parenthetical would obscure the meaning Jahangiri wishes to evoke, so too would altering it to read "racism, colonialism, zionism, antizionism, militarism" would no doubt be met with puzzlement. She seeks to link gender violence to various malign political movements; not to power as a general social feature. The implication is that gender violence comes attached to bad politics, and this itself opens the door to particular forms of victim-blaming and gaslighting that rely upon the rhetorical and political moves Jahangiri is making. If sexual violence is treated as a function of things like "racism" or "colonialism", what does one do when one's particular domain doesn't clearly lend itself to that narrative? What happens if the person who assaults you is a fellow in your anti-war group, or a leader in your anti-colonial resistance cell? In fact, we know exactly how the narrative plays out in those context: keep quiet, it didn't really happen, it's for the cause, you don't want to play into the enemy's hands, only a traitor or a turncoat would slander us so, if it happened here it can't be rape.

The ability to latch onto those narratives is, itself, a form of power that enables and insulates sexual violence, and it is an ability that one doesn't see unless one crafts a broader narrative of gender violence inside "good" politics. One can elide the problem by seeking to trace it all the way back to some corruption instilled by white supremacy, and maybe sometimes that's plausible. But for many women, this is a cloud of dust kicked up to obscure a more straight-forward truth: "this man assaulted me, and he was able to do so and get away with it because of the progressive modalities of power we were a part of." And while I don't think Jahangiri would endorse the claim that gender violence doesn't manifest inside "good" political spaces, this demonstrates the pernicious aspect of presupposition -- just like with the man who agrees the pitcher "throws like a girl," it gets us to affirm things indirectly that we'd never say directly.

In any event, what would a narrative of a specifically anti-Zionist form of gendered violence look like? It could start with the widespread expulsion of Middle Eastern Jews from Arab nations, an expulsion carried out under an anti-Zionist banner and one in which sexual threat and violence was very much a tool in the oppressive toolbox. It is a marker of the "success" of this violence that there are now very few Jews left to be subjected to anti-Zionist gendered violence in many of the spaces where anti-Zionism as a form of power is at its apex -- a fact that can easily be confused with denying anti-Zionism as existing at all as a meaningful form of gendered power (upon arriving in Israel, Middle Eastern Jews then faced separate victimization -- also often very much gendered -- by an Ashkenazi elite. Recent Mizrahi history overflows with such oppression, and unfortunately precisely because there is such a cornucopia of examples to choose from contemporary writings on the gendered oppression of Mizrahim are easily able to cherry-pick their favorites to advance either a Zionist or anti-Zionist historiography. The problem of using genuine oppression as a stalking horse for other political commitments is an issue I will return to below).

Moving forward, we could turn to a putative feminist activist in Egypt who specifically urged rape and sexual harassment be deployed against "Zionist" women as a means of anti-Zionist "resistance" -- culminating in the chilling warning "leave the land so we won't rape you." In Egypt, anti-Zionism occupies a position of power, and here we see how it can easily accommodate gender violence constructed through a sort of anti-colonialist resistance. Zionists are, after all, "raping" the land -- so why isn't turnabout fair play?

These are severe examples. But the mechanics can play out more subtly. In certain feminist spaces, anti-Zionism carries power, and it uses that power to expel, eliminate, or otherwise exclude certain women -- generally Jewish women who either are Zionist or don't perform non- or anti-Zionism in a sufficiently flagrant manner. We saw this, or attempts at this, at the Chicago Dyke March, at Creating Change in Chicago (Jahangari, writing for Feministing, endorsed that one too), at Columbia University, at the "targeting" by JVP of Jewish Queer Youth for infiltration and disruption. If these places are designed to be spaces of resistance to gender violence (and they certainly hold themselves out that way), then these acts of exclusion are instances of power -- acting through anti-Zionism -- functioning to make women and sexual minorities more vulnerable and more prone to such violence. And this form of violence, in turn, gets laundered and insulated through the particular frame of anti-Zionist power which acts to legitimize or even valorize it.

I don't actually want to pursue this further; my point isn't to provide a comprehensive gendered account of either anti-Zionist or Zionist violence (I'm not sure I'd be qualified to do so in any event). And if you're reading this as "Zionism isn't the problem, anti-Zionism is!" you're missing the point, in more ways than one. Zionism and anti-Zionism are distinctive, but not distinct, in that they can and do create and buttress their own forms of gender violence just as any other site of power can.  Any effective counter to these distinctive forms of gender violence needs to explore the phenomenon of gender violence in these arenas as distinctive -- that is, they need know what makes gender violence work here rather than some abstract and general theory of what makes it work everywhere.

III.

So why, then, does this all feel so damn hard? We need a narrative of gender violence enabled by Zionism, just as we need one for anti-Zionism, just as for Hollywood just as for Evangelicalism just as for policing.

It feels hard in part because the people most excited to craft these narratives tend to have ulterior motives. They do it because they don't like Zionism or anti-Zionism, and they want to make their target look bad. This tends to lead to quite partial (in all senses) analyses and casts a pall over the whole endeavor -- but it also demonstrates some of the dialogical prerequisites necessary to do the analysis right. To illustrate, consider another case of a social practice which very much needs a distinctive analysis of its linkage to gender violence: Islam.

Islam (like -- to be clear -- Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Atheism ....) is in some places a position of power, and therefore in some places constructs and buttresses gendered violence in a distinctive way. Yet to speak of a distinctively "Muslim" form of gender violence makes many of us blanche, and for understandable reasons. All too often, the people who are purporting to draw out this distinctive connection are doing so as a stalking horse for other -- Islamophobic -- politics. Their goal isn't really to provide an accurate or cohesive picture of how Islam-as-power and gender violence intersect. It's to present Islam is a distinctively bad, corrupt, oppressive, or backwards.

Endeavors of this sort aren't really hard to spot. Sometimes, the bad faith lies right there on the surface: Islamofascism Awareness Week is "that magical time of year when Republicans briefly pretend to care about gay rights." But the more comprehensive tell is in the tone the analysis takes. There's a palpable sense of excitement, of glee, in uncovering how Islam really, truly, fundamentally, inalterably is misogynistic. And as a result, their constructions of Islam are sharply essentialist and unyielding in declaring that the only authentic, legitimate, viable Islam is the sort that oppresses women. The last thing these interpreters want is for resources to emerge within Islam, getting their power from Islam, which can serve as points of resistance against gendered violence. The entire point is for Islam to be irredeemably corrupt; any actual pathways opened up for Muslim women are accidental and immediately sacrificed if they risk admitting that Muslim women qua Muslim women might have agency, that Islam is something that can give to them and not just take from them (for all the talk about liberals not backing "Muslim feminists", it's the conservatives who truly hate them insofar as they're Muslim feminists and therefore must be hypocrites, delusional, and/or liars. Ex-Muslim feminists, now they're a different story....).

Thin as her parenthetical is, there's no real question that something quite like this is Jahangari's project. Grouping Zionism in with entities like racism and colonialism presents it -- presupposes it -- as ontologically irredeemable, flawed to its essence (again, this is why "anti-Zionist" can't fit -- even if she conceded that it could manifest through gendered violence, she'd want to insist it was and could be more than that). And because it's the anti-Zionism, not the anti-sexism, that motivates the inquiry, Jahangari wants this to be true. The last thing she wants is resources emerging within Zionism that could counter or resist gender violence, even though that'd seemingly be a net gain for the fight against misogyny. Such a prospect is inconceivable, indeed contradictory, to her; it is like the prospect of a "feminist racism" -- impossible in concept and undesirable in practice. Zionism is a diseased tree, all of its fruit must likewise be poisonous. The predictable result is that she will ignore, overlook, or dismiss the myriad ways in which one could find gender- (and otherwise-)egalitarianism within and through Zionism.

This is the reason why speaking about distinctively Zionist or anti-Zionist "forms" of gender violence is hard. It's because they're very often stalking horses for other, less savory political commitments; or are easily co-opted into their service. There's good reason for suspicion as to motives, and good reason for suspicion as to accuracy. Without a deep and comprehensive understanding of Palestinian and Arab history, experience, and oppression, and (probably) without significant sympathy for and affinity towards Palestinians and a desire to see them fully vindicated in their quest for national liberation and equality, the author of an "anti-Zionist form of gender violence" is likely to get it wrong, often in very serious ways. Likewise, without a deep and comprehensive understanding of Jewish history, experience, and oppression, and (probably) without significant sympathy for and affinity towards Jews and a desire to see us fully vindicated in our quest for national liberation and equality, the author of a "Zionist form of gender violence" is equally likely to badly misstep. Put simply, it is not unreasonable to demand that persons undertaking the politically and ethically delicate task of tying Zionism (or anti-Zionism)  to gender violence be persons who have shown themselves aware of the full complexity of the issue and who are not inclined to engage in a political hit job.

All of this is a way of saying that, just as discourses that are anti-colonial or anti-racist or anti-Zionist (or Zionist) don't stand outside of patterns of gender violence, neither do discourses about gender violence stand outside of racist, colonialist, or antisemitic or Islamophobic patterns. And that brings us to the final point I want to make, which is about the website which published this essay.

The Feministing tag for "Racism" has dozens upon dozens of entries. So does "Transphobia" Likewise "Islamophobia". That's good. That shows they are invested in those issues, recognizes their importance, and has some familiarity with their complexity and nuances. It doesn't make them beyond reproach -- that's not my place to say -- but it does suggest that these are matters they take seriously and can speak on with some authority.

The tag for "Anti-Semitism" has two posts. And one of them never actually mentions anti-Semitism at all (the other is from three years ago).

One need not demand perfectly equal time to think that maybe, just maybe, for a globally-oriented anti-oppression site antisemitism is more than a two (rounding up) post problem. But evidently Jewish oppression is not something Feministing writes a lot about, and there is no evidence that it is something it knows a lot about. That's not condemnable in of itself -- lots of people don't know lots of things -- but it might suggest that arenas involving Jews are arenas they shouldn't write on. There's little evidence that Feministing is the sort of place where one would find "a deep and comprehensive understanding of Jewish history, experience, and oppression", let alone "significant sympathy for and affinity towards Jews and a desire to see us fully vindicated in our quest for national liberation and equality." Lacking those qualifications, it is exceptionally unlikely that Feministing is a good candidate for exploring this issue in a non-oppressive way, and it shouldn't make the attempt. There are plenty of Zionist-identified websites who like nothing more than regaling everyone with how hopeless backwards, regressive, illiberal, and repressive Palestinian society is (towards women and everyone else), and they should desist as well -- they're not helping anyone, I sincerely doubt they're trying to help anyone, and they're not good at their jobs.

But Feministing certainly aspires to greater heights than that, so I don't feel bad about subjecting it to more comprehensive critique. This controversy was, in no small part, Jews telling Feministing that its presuppositions about Jewish political practices were wrong, stilted, and offensive. Thus far, Feministing hasn't shown itself receptive to the critique; it clearly thinks what was said was wholly inbounds and offered no basis for objection. We can be a bit perplexed about what undergirds its confidence on the matter, given Feministing's general lack of attention to the issue. But that never seems to stop anyone. The heart of antisemitism in its epistemic dimension is the perceived entitlement to talk about Jews without knowing about Jews.

One suspects that, even if they read this post, the editors of Feministing won't make any adjustments in response to it. There's almost no pressure on left-wing websites to talk about antisemitism, and there's even less pressure on them to not talk about other matters of concern to Jews if they don't talk about antisemitism. There are other discourses of power operating on and around Jews which rationalize this behavior; most notably the trope of Jewish hyperpower which takes "ignoring Jews" and reconstructs it into "resisting overbearing Jews Zionists" (and how easy would that be to deploy here: "Zionists -- so touchy and fragile that a single parenthetical aside can spawn a 4,000 word essay!" If it's not already clear, I tip my cap to the cleverness of the move if nothing else).

The next most likely (which is not to say likely) move is to start writing on antisemitism more -- but from a perspective that just happens to be perfectly harmonious with the political positions they wanted to hold about Jews prior to starting. Such a move would be very easy to pull off -- I'm sure a dozen JVP activists are already primed to volunteer -- but that wouldn't make it any less of a bad faith maneuver. It lets the tail wag the dog; instead of accepting the potential that positions might need adjustment in response to a Jewish narrative, it seeks to adjust which Jew they listen to for the sake of preserving a set of political commitments arrived at prior to any serious reckoning with Jewish voices. (Incidentally, the appeal of this particular tactic explains why groups like JVP are so often gatekeepers seeking to exclude other, more mainline Jewish voices, from inclusion in the feminist tent. If one needs a Jewish voice, and they've made it so they're the only Jewish voice in the room, then a lot more people will be relying on them and their power gets magnified tremendously. And the real kicker is that they can insulate their privileged position by recharacterizing the absence of other Jews -- which they facilitated through exclusion -- as proof that Jews-not-them don't deserve to be in the room and can justly be ignored).

If they did want to ethically broach these topics, they'll have to challenge themselves more than that. But to be honest, I'm not sure the groundwork is ripe for Feministing, specifically, to do this work at this time (which isn't to say that nobody can do it). There's no rule that says every site has to be qualified to tackle every form of injustice. Feministing has a serious blindspot on Jewish issues, and if they set about resolving it based on commitments they formed by and through the exclusionary practices they're supposedly seeking to rectify, the "reform" will almost certainly be a corrupted and partial one.

There's a lot to be said on Zionism, Anti-Zionism, Gender Violence, and Power. Someone -- probably not Feministing -- should get on that.

Saturday, October 21, 2017

Egregious Professor Roundup

I got an email from an academic in Italy addressed to "Egregious Professor David Schraub." Apparently, that's a common issue because "egregio" has a meaning closer to "excellent" in Italian. Nonetheless, I kind of want to change my Twitter handle to "Egregious Professor."

* * *

This is a from last year, but Jacob Levy gives a qualified defense of "safe spaces" in the academic context that is really fantastic, and well-worth a read.

Fifteen Jewish extremists arrested in Israel for threatening Arabs, including the notorious Bentzi Gopstein.

The Montana Republican Party is the sort of place where, if you bodyslam a reporter, you'll have to fend off criticism -- from those who say you should have shot him.

Kevin Williamson has an interesting piece on the pathologies of poor White communities. I don't necessarily endorse it, but it is a rare example of someone taking the way we talk about poor Black communities and earnestly applying those same standards to Trump-backing Whites.

Bezalel Smotrich is a dick in every single possible aspect, so his remarks on the "me too" campaign are entirely on-brand.

Remember how I said "Not Knowing "Zio" is a Slur is an Indictment, Not a Defense"? Yeah, same thing applies to not knowing that portraying George Soros as tentacle-monster encircling the globe is antisemitic.


Thursday, October 12, 2017

The Many Voices of Silence

One of the more vexing questions raised by the recent flurry of sexual assault allegations against Harvey Weinstein was why, if "everybody knew", nobody spoke up? Why did people -- colleagues, victims, friends, press -- stay silent for so long? Is it right to blame them (all of them? some of them? which ones?) for not talking? Why?

On this subject, I'd like to share a story (I might have written about it before, though if so I can't find it) from when I was in college.

I was working a summer job at a law firm. Two of my closest friends from that summer -- also college students, both women -- worked together in the mail room; I worked by myself in another wing of the office. What that meant was that we didn't really see each other during working hours, but we did eat lunch together pretty much every day.

About a week before the end of the summer, in our daily lunch walk, one of them said she wanted to ask me something personal. She said that she thought she was being sexually harassed by her supervisor, and she wanted to know what I thought she should do about it. Should she say anything? Should she report it? The summer was about to end anyway; maybe she should just ride it out.

The "thought" part is important, because part of the conversation was her being unsure whether what was happening was sexual harassment. She seemed to be consistently talking herself into and out of her own position on the matter. She'd say things that to my mind clearly sounded like harassment, but when I'd concur in the assessment she'd second-guess herself and start redescribing the events more as if he was just sort of a generically lousy boss. Then eventually she'd reach the end of the pendulum and return back to it being harassment. She went back-and-forth in that vein for awhile, and never really settled on a conclusion.

I'm not really sure why she thought I'd have any unique insight. I wasn't any older than them, and had no particular experience in the area. The best advice I could give -- and to this day I don't know if it was good advice -- was that if she felt like it was sexual harassment she should report it, and if she felt like the guy was simply a bad supervisor she should wait out the week and leave.

Meanwhile, the second friend -- who also worked in the mailroom and to whom I periodically was turning to for clarification -- was making gestures and facial expressions to the effect of "I want absolutely no part in this." I could tell this all was bothering her as well, but she was firmly on the "don't say anything, don't do anything" side. I asked her why.

She told a story of being harassed at her middle school. And there was no "thought" there: she was being groped in the halls, people were tearing off her blouse, it was truly sickening behavior. And what did she do? She did complain. She and her parents went to the principal, told him what was going on, and demanded he put a stop to it.

The result? Nothing happened.

Well, not "nothing". The principal wasn't happy to have this thrust on her plate, and so now the administration started retaliating against her for complaining. Her entire position at the school became untenable. So she transferred to a different school -- one less convenient and less academically prestigious.

The moral she learned was "don't complain about sexual harassment." Hence, she made clear, she would neither confirm, nor deny, nor participate in any way in any conversation about any sexual harassment she or her friend may or may not have experienced in the mail room.

I'm not entirely sure how this story ended, but I don't think anybody ended up saying anything to the powers-that-be. Why not? Well, I didn't in part because I don't think either of them wanted me to, in part because I didn't know what I should say, and in part because I didn't view it as my place to speak (particularly given Friend #2's vivid description of the potential consequences for them if I talked). I imagine Friend #2 didn't talk because of the "lessons" she learned the last time she tried to fight back against harassment. And if Friend #1 didn't talk, it might have been because she was afraid the same might happen to her, or because she ultimately wasn't confident in her own credibility as a complainant, or because the end was in sight and she just wanted to put things behind her.

There are all sorts of reasons for all sorts of silence. One of my personal mentors, Martha Nussbaum -- surely one of the most powerful (in all senses of the term) women in the world today -- spoke incisively about why she never reported her sexual assault and why, even now, she continues to think it was and would continue to be useless to have done so. Silence can be complicity, and sometimes it's nothing more than that. But sometimes it is much more than that. Silence is the function of an entire network of power in which everybody feels alone, everybody feels powerless, everybody feels like they can't make a difference and that the only thing that will be gained from speaking up is hurting those who deserve it least.

Put another way, the condemnations of those who "knew" and said nothing often act as if the problem was just lack of character virtue -- if people cared more, then they wouldn't remain silent. This, to my estimation, dramatically understates the cultural forces which encourage and demand silence at every turn. The forces are not -- or are not just -- threats of reprisal. They're also bonds of trust ("you promised you wouldn't say anything if I confided"), norms of role ("it's not your place to do this for me"), and desires for lost privacy ("I just don't want this to become the center of my life"). When I hear about something that "everybody knows" but nobody says, my assumption isn't that "everybody" is a callous monster. I assume that there is something deeper going on.

When it comes to sexual assault, silence occurs in isolation, while resistance comes in groups. This is why one woman catching Weinstein bragging about sexual assault on a wiretap set up by the NYPD didn't bring Weinstein down, but many women telling a reporter (who lacks guns, or handcuffs, or prison threats) causes a cascade. Taken alone, we can't imagine how our speaking up could possibly make a difference -- it will only bring trouble. They stay silent because if they speak up:
  • They'll be threatened ("you'll never work in this town again"); and/or
  • They'll be ignored ("she's just seeking attention"); and/or
  • They'll be mocked ("what makes you so special that you think Harvey Weinstein would make eyes at you?"); and/or
  • They'll be shamed ("what did you think you were getting into, going to a meeting with him alone?"); and/or
  • They'll be discredited ("Weinstein is a public figure; if he was a predator there's no way he could've kept it a secret for so long.").
And after all that heartache? Weinstein remains untouched, but the accuser has to live with the knowledge that her accusation meant nothing.

But when enough people refuse to cooperate, that massive array of power, which felt like it was an impregnable fortress, starts to topple like dominos. The people who could end your career in Hollywood now need to rush to show they're not beholden to a tainted figure like Harvey Weinstein. The "attention" oddly dissipates because it's spread across so many victims. The mockery falls flat because it is evident that Weinstein was a serial assailant. The shame doesn't stick because so many verify how he got so many women in a vulnerable position.

But the thing is, it's difficult to make that jump from being relatively alone to relatively in a community. It requires a lot of things, and courage is certainly one of them. But again, I don't think the problem is simply one of bad hearts. It's about bad culture. And I don't expect things to change much until that culture is unwound.

Sunday, December 04, 2016

Sunday Fun Day Roundup

Getting donuts this afternoon with an old college friend (and her new baby!). A lot of the below links really deserve their own posts, but I just don't have the time or energy to give them the commentary they deserve.

* * *

Rabbi Jeremy Wieder of Yeshiva University confronts racism among Orthodox Jewish students at his university. Really worth a read.

South Dakota gets a Chabad Rabbi -- the last state to not have one. Congratulations, Sioux Falls!

Jonathan Chait nails the "intellectual collapse of the center." Regarding David Brooks: "[O]ne of the most common genres of David Brooks column was a sad lament that neither party would endorse policies that in fact Obama had explicitly and publicly called for."

Yehuda Mirsky on the "The New Jewish Question" is perhaps the most thoughtful meditation on the place of Jews in the new, populist-right America (and world) that I've read so far. Another one that deserves your full attention.

I've never seen Last Tango in Paris, but it looks like an infamous rape scene in the movie actually involved raping the actress (she neither was informed in advance nor consented). That's really, truly sick.

Thursday, March 19, 2015

Look Who's Talking

This is one of those posts that's really about saving a link for myself, but I am interested in these poll results asking Whites and Blacks about the amount of time we spend talking about race. The results aren't really surprising -- most Whites think we talk about race too much, most Blacks think we don't talk about it enough. The reason I'm interested is because I've noticed in several contexts a disjuncture between how different groups view how much time we devote to different issues. For example, in the sexual assault context, there is a "left" narrative that says we undersell the problem -- we need to "break the silence", we need to bring the problem to the surface -- and there is a "right" narrative that suggests that talk about sexual assault is ever-present to the point of absurdity -- everything is being called sexual assault, sexual assault talk is crowding out other related but important issues. Racism seems to also fit inside this mold; I suspect anti-Semitism does as well.

Wednesday, December 03, 2014

Things People Blame the Jews For, Volume XIII: Paris Hilton

Paris Hilton has received some very threatening messages lately. I still am not 100% sure why anyone cares about Paris Hilton at all (having never wrapped my head around the circular "she's a celebrity because she's a celebrity" bit), but unfortunately it seems like such abuse is par for the course for any person (particularly any woman) in the public eye. These threats, in particular, center around Hilton's Jewish identity:
“I know ur Jew family gives nothing” and “KILL JEWS FOR FUN” are among the threats that have been left on the Instagram account of Hilton and her father, Rick, TMZ reported Tuesday. The man also has threatened to kill and rape Paris Hilton.
Those are pretty sick. But I have news for the writer:

Paris Hilton is not Jewish. Nor is her family. Indeed, I'd struggle to find a more non-Jewish name than "Hilton" this side of "Christianson". I'm assuming the mistake came when someone just assumed any wealthy family supposedly degrading American morals was, of course, Jewish. Since that makes a ton of sense.

But whatever. Welcome to the club, Paris Hilton. I hope you enjoy your stay (and of course, I hope the cops find the schmuck who threatened you).

Monday, October 06, 2014

Necrophiliacs Anonymous

California recently passed new rules governing campus sexual assault, predicated on the idea of "affirmative consent":
"Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent.
Jon Chait, David Bernstein, Batya Ungar-Sargon, Cathy Young, and Michelle Goldberg (among others) all cry foul. There are several themes to their complaints, which I feel are worth addressing.

First, let me take a moment to articulate what I take this bill to mean. Put simply, I think "affirmative consent" means nothing more than that the person involved actually consents. "Consent" does not spring into being other than by a conscious decision of the participants that they are consenting. We're looking to the state of mind of the sexual participant -- do they conceptualize themselves as consenting? Other models of consent don't really ask this question, because they're looking to the state of mind of the accused. Did something happen that might have put him on reasonable notice that his partner was not consenting? "Silence" supposedly won't cut it because, well, why should he infer anything at all from silence? Silence isn't evidence, it's a lack of evidence. Note here the default assumption that a women is consenting to sex that occurs, which can only be rebutted by some overt act withdrawing it--traditionally restricted to physical resistance although now more expansive ("no means no")--giving the man knowledge that his partner does not consent and the sexual act is now illicit. Silence is presumed to be consent because no affirmative step was taken to withdraw consent; the burden is on the woman to withdraw consent rather than on the man to procure it.

This has several important implications. First, either way we're going to require an "affirmative" act of something -- consent or nonconsent. Either the man is responsible for taking steps to ensure consent exists or the woman is responsible for taking steps to confirm that it doesn't. It is unclear why, between these two competing candidates for positive obligations, the former is so much worse, so much more onerous, than the latter.

Second, recognizing that "affirmative consent" means the existence of actual (not just presumed) consent counters the claim that there is a disjuncture between the "letter of the law" and what will actually be prosecuted under it. The claim here is that while a great many sex acts will "technically" be rape under the statute, we need not worry because the partner allegedly victimized won't press charges (presumably since she actually was fine with the sex). The "problem", we're told, is that this relies on underenforcement of a badly written law -- the sex in question is rape under the law, we're just depending on the beneficence of prosecutors to overlook it. But this seems to rest on a misunderstanding: I don't think under the California bill a case could successfully be brought if the alleged victim testified that she actually did consent. Nonconsent is still an element of the offense, and while it cannot be rejected simply from silence or a prior existing relationship, it obviously can be negated by an outright declaration by the supposed victim that actually, yes, she did desire the sexual activity.

This also relates to the supposed "ambiguity" latent in the definition of consent. How will we know if consent does not exist absent an overt declaration to that effect? I could retort "how do we know if consent exists absent such a declaration" -- a response that demonstrates that this debate is actually about default rules. Do we presume a woman consents unless she manages to convince us otherwise? But the bigger point is that both the call and the response are absurd, resting on a naive belief that (on the one hand) verbal declarations are infallible and (on the other) there is no other means but through verbal statements to reliably communicate information. Does any one believe this? Of course not. If a woman says "yes" with a knife to her throat, we all are quite capable of using context to disregard the statement. And if a woman violently thrashes about or tries to flee the room, I can't imagine we'd likewise have any difficulty inferring nonconsent regardless of whether she actually said "no" or not. If we can do it for nonconsent, why not consent?

Indeed, to a large extent I find the focus on what we supposedly can't infer from "silence" to be nothing short of bizarre. I'm imagining a completely inert woman, who says nothing, does nothing, takes no voluntary action or otherwise exhibits no signals or reaction whatsoever to an ongoing sex act. Having sex with such a person strikes me less as "the grey area between consent and nonconsent" and more like necrophilia. Far from wondering what it means if your partner is completely silent and completely nonresponsive to one's sexual advances; that to me seems to raise very little doubts regarding whether actual consent has been obtained. Does anyone even desire sex like this while still purporting to want a consenting partner? I'm no Casanova, but I'm pretty sure that if your sexual escapades are occurring in complete and utter silence that should be a red flag no matter what your beliefs about sexual assault might be.

This is not to say there are no cases where there might be ambiguity. But ambiguity is inherent in any legal standard. Consider the facts of State v. Rusk (facts recounted at the link). That case, I think, is very easy under an "affirmative consent" rule but obviously quite difficult under the default rule where one needs to affirmatively demonstrate nonconsent. Another case I recall (unfortunately I can't find it) involved a woman who was jogging in an isolated wooded area. A man who outweighed her by over one hundred pounds literally lifted her up and dragged her off the path, and proceeded to have sex with her. She testified that she didn't resist (futile because of the size differential) or call out (futile because of how far away she was from civilization), figuring that either action might provoke the man to greater violence. Does her "silence" mean consent? What about "I don't know if we should -- my husband is in the next room"? If the man keeps going, has she consented or not? Two can play at the ambiguity game.

Finally, I want to briefly address a complaint I've seen from several sources -- that the California definition of consent is flawed because it would label huge swaths of the American population as rapists. Bernstein's title gets the point across in blunt fashion: "YOU are a rapist; yes YOU!"; and a significant portion of Chait's piece is focused on this concern as well. As a descriptive matter, I have no idea whether this is true -- have most people had sexual encounters where there partner actually did not consent to the act (even if, in their own head, we might have thought they did)? But I want to flag it because I think it presents a very odd -- yet very widely held -- normative position: that by definition rape must be something that is rare (or at least, confined to a narrow class of perpetrators). A definition of rape that encompasses lots of people as perpetrators is, by virtue of that fact, a flawed definition. I raised this possibility in Sticky Slopes -- that we inversely relate the severity of a norm (how bad is rape) with its scope (how many behaviors do we categorize as rape). There is no intrinsic reason, of course, why any such relation should exist. Rape can be very evil and heinous and widely implicate large portions of the American population. There is no rule that says evil must be confined to a narrow band of recognized evildoers.

I should say that Chait, at least, seems to also be making a prescriptive point that where behavior is widespread then sweeping moral condemnation of it is unlikely to be successful. He has some empirical backing for this position (Dan Kahan's work on "gentle nudges" versus "hard shoves"), and that is worth considering to the extent our primary concern is changing behavior. But I want to reemphasize that, while this may accurately describe our moral outlooks, it does not dissipate the strangeness of that conclusion. There is something odd -- almost cheating -- in arguing against a moral claim solely because it would condemn common behavior. It's a naturalistic fallacy on steroids.

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Easy Does It

A.J. Delgado in the National Review (2014):
Now, the term “rape” or “sexual assault” is thrown around almost effortlessly, accusations easily made and lives easily ruined.
And Sir Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1680):
[Rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.
In conclusion, that Delgado's thesis is identical to how rape was viewed in the late 17th century in no way implies that her assessment likely derives from a similar view of women and female autonomy.

See also my 2011 post On Bad Critiques of Rape Prevelance Studies (Part II). The idea that "crying rape" (that's literally the title of Delgado's article) is some sort of pervasive phenomenon, as if going through a rape investigation is the epitome of a fun girl's night out, continues to astonish me.

Monday, December 09, 2013

Preponderance!

James Taranto accuses the Obama administration of waging a "war on men" through its efforts to ensure colleges take a harder line on sexual assault on campus. His evidence is an anecdote of an Auburn student who he contends was falsely accused of sexual assault but was nonetheless expelled from campus. I've talked before about my fear of being falsely accused of something, so I should be a sympathetic audience. I am not, because even assuming that the student in question did not commit any wrongdoing at all (and of course, Taranto is a polemicist with an interest in recounting the facts in his favor), he still fails to actually make an argument about what is supposedly systematically wrong with how colleges -- post-Obama administration pressure -- handle rape allegations such that it represents a "war on men".

To begin, it is important to remember (since Tarento apparently does not) that we are not dealing with a criminal proceeding, or even a civil proceeding (though it is closer to the latter). There is no risk of prison time here. There isn't even the risk of monetary damages. The student here wasn't sent to jail, he was sent to the University of South Carolina Upstate.

All Auburn, a private actor, can do is decline to continue its private relationship with one of its students. One can put varying value on just how important it is that persons be "protected" in that circumstance (more on that below), and indeed I may well think it is deserving of considerable protection. But at the outset, the default rules should be those in a private, quasi-judicial proceeding that does not carry with it criminal penalties or even significant civil penalties. The question is whether or not Auburn's processes match up with the degree of "process" required in those circumstances.

With that prelude, let's address Tarento. He basically has three objections:

First, he is upset that the tribunal credited the victim over the accused. Taranto doesn't think that the victim was persuasive, and he particularly doesn't think that the testimony of the sexual assault experts was probative in making her more credible. But in any adjudicative proceeding credibility assessments are going to be somewhat arbitrary -- based on gut feelings and assessments of he-said-she-said claims. That's unavoidable, and Taranto provides no way of avoiding nor any reason why it is more distressing in this context than in other "civil" (or private) tort claims.

Second, Taranto doesn't think the proceedings were sufficiently professional or legalistic. Again, it is doubtful that Taranto thinks every private institution needs to have a full-blown judicial hearing in front of a federal judge every time it wants to discipline someone. Indeed, compared to the due process I'd get if, say, my employer fired me tomorrow based on whatever rationale (which is to say, none at all), Auburn still comes out far ahead (perhaps I am not giving Taranto enough credit, and he is actually a major union booster and critic of the at-will employment doctrine). Even in the university context, I doubt he believes such process is necessary in the majority of discipline cases(if someone was being expelled for vandalism, say, or cheating).

Finally, Taranto complains about the burden of proof requirement -- a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. It is interesting that, given his frame of an Obama administration "war on men", he quietly admits that this is the only element of Auburn's process that is actually attributable to the Obama administration. In any event, a preponderance of the evidence standard -- which basically means "more likely than not", is apparently outrageous, but once again Taranto doesn't give any reason why. The preponderance of the evidence standard, after all, is the default legal standard in non-criminal cases. If private party A tries to enlist the levers of the judiciary to deprive private party B of a property interest in a non-criminal matter, generally the case will be adjudicated under the preponderance of the evidence standard.

Should there be a different standard of proof for private adjudications of sexual assault claims, making it harder for victims to win their cases in the university context? Maybe! But Taranto doesn't provide one. He basically yells that colleges provide the same basic adjudicatory standards in sexual assault cases as they do in other analogous contexts (which is to say, far more than private employers provide), as if that is self-evidently outrageous, and that in a particular case in Auburn it might have led to a person losing a property interest that he shouldn't have. Even if he is right about this case (and again, he is no more reliable a narrator than anyone else), it doesn't show any defect in the procedures -- even very good systems make mistakes, and the anecdote is not a substitute for data. And while an argument for more stringent standards could certainly be made, such an argument would need to be both more vigorously argued and (more importantly) generalized to a broader commitment to the rights of persons who have a functional liberty and property interest that derives from a contractual arrangement with a private entity. If Taranto wants to go down that road, he's welcome to it, but he can't demand a privileged position only for accused rapists.

Friday, September 06, 2013

Appeal to Procedure

Some of you may have heard that a Montana judge imposed a thirty-day sentence in a statutory rape case where s teacher slept with a 14 year old student. Some of you may have then read that the judge was planning to revisit that sentence. And then finally some of you may have read today's headline, which states that "Montana high court blocks hearing on resentencing rapist of girl". And you might have every right to be upset -- except this headline is misleading.

The ruling here does not necessarily mean that the original sentence will stand. Rather, it is a very mundane point of procedure: the trial court can't revisit the sentence at this stage; rather, the remedy is for the appellate courts to review the sentence. As both the prosecution and the defense argued, allowing the trial court to redo its sentencing would dramatically muddy the legal waters on appeal and make it far harder for the appellate courts to provide a full and fair review of the original (or revised) sentence.

So boo to misleading headlines, but everybody else take a deep breath. You may need to save your outrage for later, but at least keep it in the pocket for now.