Showing posts with label theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label theory. Show all posts

Sunday, April 10, 2011

After the Screen: Array Aesthetics and Transmateriality

At the risk of some sort of blog-will-eat-itself situation, I'm posting this paper, presented at TIIC last November, which includes several threads developed here previously - arrays, transmateriality, and the work of HC Gilje. There are some new bits too however, on screens, projection mapping, and lots of tasty examples of a putative "post-screen" practice.

1. Glowing Rectangles


For all the diversity of the contemporary media ecology - network, broadcast, games, mobile - one technical form is entirely dominant. Screens are everywhere, at every scale, in every context. As well as the archetypal "big" and "small" screens of cinema and television we are now familiar with pocket- and book-sized screens, public screens as advertising or signage, urban screens at architectural scales. As satirical news site The Onion observes, we "spend the vast majority of each day staring at, interacting with, and deriving satisfaction from glowing rectangles."

Formally and technically these screens vary - in size and aspect ratio, display technology, spatiotemporal limits, and so on. They are united however in two basic attributes, which are something like the contract of the screen. First, the screen operates as a mediating substrate for its content - the screen itself recedes in favor of its hosted image. The screen is self-effacing (though never of course absent or invisible). This tendency is clearly evident in screen design and technology; we prize screens that are slight and bright - those that best make themselves disappear. Apple's "Retina" display technology claims to have passed an important perceptual threshhold of self-effacement, attaining a spatial density so high that individual pixels are indistinguishable to the naked eye (below - image Bryan Jones).


The second key attribute of contemporary digital screens is their tendency to generality. The self-effacing substrate of the screen is increasingly a general-purpose substrate - unlinked to any specific content type; equally capable of displaying anything - text, image, web site, video, or word-processor. This attribute is coupled of course to the generality of networked computing; since the era of multimedia the computer screen has led the way in modeling itself as a container for anything (just as the computer models itself a "machine for anything"). The past decade has simply seen this general-purpose container proliferate across scales and contexts, ushering us into the era of glowing rectangles.

However over the past decade in design and the media arts, a wave of practice has appeared which as this paper will argue, resists the dominance of the glowing rectangle. Given the near-total cultural saturation of the screen, this is unsurprising, given the ongoing cultural dance of fringe and mainstream in which this practice participates. This is not simply a story of resistance however. In proposing and describing two particular strains of "post-screen" practice, this paper aims firstly to outline the shared terms of their relationship with the screen, and in the process develop a more detailed sense of these conceptual devices of generality, outlined above, and its opposite, specificity. Secondly, and more briefly, it outlines a theorisation of this practice, invoking transmateriality, an account of the paradoxical materiality of (especially digital) media, and Gumbrecht's notion of presence.

2. Arrays

During the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a huge grid of drummers assembled in the stadium, each standing before a large square fou drum, a traditional Chinese instrument. Each drum was augmented with white LEDs mounted on its surface, triggered with each drum stroke. The drummers formed a vast array of discrete audiovisual elements, precisely choreographed in the style of these spectaculars. Human pixels, but coarse and resolutely human; at one point the drummers desynchronised entirely, forming a thunderous grid of flickering light. In a ceremony created for the (broadcast) screen - to the infamous extent of splicing computer-animated fireworks into its telecast in place of real ones - the drummers were a moment of involution. Their array echoed all the other, more conventionally self-effacing screens threaded through the event; but it also inverted some of their key attributes. Firstly its substrate, instead of receding behind "content", came forward; if anything substrate and content were one and the same. Secondly, while this array nods towards the generality of the screen in its choreographed patterns - which like the patterns on a screen could be "anything at all" - it veers strongly in the opposite direction, towards the here and now, what I will call specificity. As I argued at the time, the poetics of this array rely on the specificity of its elements - the drummers, drums, and their solid-state illumination - rather than the patterns that play across it.


The drummers are one popular example of a formal trope we can find throughout media arts and design practice over the past decade. Daniel Rozin's 1999 Wooden Mirror is one of the earlier examples. Wooden Mirror is an array of square wooden tiles embedded in a large octagonal frame, along with a bundle of custom electronics. The tiles are fitted with servomotors, so that each one can tilt up and down on its horizontal axis. As its angle to the light changes, each tile appears brighter or darker. Rozin wires up the array to a videocamera, to complete the mirror circuit: the brightness of pixels in the incoming image drives the angle of the tiles. Given the overtly visual logic of the work, it's interesting that its sound is equally striking: the wooden tiles clatter like mechanical rainfall, sonifying the rate of change of the image; as the image becomes still, the clatter dies off to a low twitching. Again, this array emphasises the material presence of its substrate. The tonal "generality" of the wooden mirror is functional enough to be familiar, but the coarse mechanical clattering of these pixels makes them inescapably specific.


Rozin has made many similar mirrors; notable is Trash Mirror (2001) where the individual elements - irregularly shaped pieces of rubbish - are packed into a freeform mosaic. This array moves one more step away from the homogeneous generality of the digital screen. Here the elements are irregular in size and shape, but also carry their own specific textures and colours. In Mirrors Mirror(2008) the regular grid returns, but the array elements are themselved replaced by mirrors; as these tilt they reflect different parts of the environment. Here the location of the tonal "content" in the array is, like the image source, deferred to the environment. In a familiar digital screen, image elements are luminous modules whose colour value is independent and absolute. In Rozin's Wooden Mirror that value becomes relative - tonality is based on self-shading, which depends on the lighting of the work. In Mirrors Mirror this relativity is multiplied; each element will reflect a different portion of the environment, depending on both its angle and the viewpoint of the observer.


In many cases these media art arrays depart from the two-dimensional grid entirely. Robert Henke and Christopher Bauder's ATOM (2007-8) (above) is an eight-by-eight grid of white helium balloons, each one fitted with LED illumination and tethered to a computer-controlled winch. The grid becomes a mobile, configurable light-form, tightly coupled with Henke's electronic soundtrack in live performance. This array lowers its resolution drastically, and limits its generality in one dimension (monochrome elements), but extends its reach (literally) into a third axis. ART+COM's 2008 kinetic sculpture at the BMW museum uses a similar configuration, but a higher "resolution" - in this case 714 metal spheres are suspended from motorised cables, forming a smoothly undulating matrix - a sort of programmed corporate ballet. Cloud (2008), a sculpture in Heathrow airport by London art and design firm Troika, illustrates another permutation: here a 2d array forms the skin of a large three-dimensional sculptural form. In this case the elements are electromagnetic flip-dots - components often used in airport signage before it was overtaken by glowing rectangles. As in Rozin's Mirrors, Troika consciously exploit the materiality, gestural character and the sound of these retro-pixels. rAndom International's 2010 Swarm Light demonstrates a "saturated" 3d array. The work consists of three cubic arrays of white LED lights, each ten elements per side; these cubic volumes host a flowing, flickering "swarm" of sound-responsive agents which traverse the space, brightening or dimming the array as they move.


The work of British designers United Visual Artists offers a useful longitudinal study in post-screen imaging; in particular their work addresses one of the central technical players in this field, LED lighting. UVA's first project involved a huge LED array that formed the stage set of Massive Attack's 100th Window tour. Unlike more screenful video backdrops, this low-res grid had an inescapable presence, hung directly behind the band and looming over the stage. Rather than an image machine, UVA treat the grid as a luminous dot-matrix for the twitching alphanumeric characters of real-time data. In subsequent work UVA develop this approach in a number of directions, but digitally articulated light - enabled by the LED - is a recurring theme. In Monolith (2006) UVA use a pair of large, full-colour LED screens, but treat them as a dynamic light source rather than a substrate for images; subtle gradients and washes of colour spill over the audience and into the installation environment, coupled with generated sound. In Volume (2006), another installation piece, the array elements are long vertical LED strips, again treated as generators of pattern, colour and sound; the work forms an interactive field as each element responds to nearby activity. In the context of this steady dismemberment of the screen, UVA's later work The Speed of Light is notable in that it leaves LED arrays aside entirely. Instead it uses installed lasers manipulated into dynamic, walk-in calligraphy, as if light had been finally prised away from its digital substrate, and turned loose in the environment.


Beyond their formal similarities, these arrays share some core approaches and contexts which provide a coherent portrait of a sort of post-screen practice. These works adopt one key feature of the screen - the "generality" of an articulated substrate - but trade it off to varying extents for more "specificity" - exploiting the local, particular materiality of the work and its environment. This specificity is also technological, reflecting a practice that crafts hard- and software into idiosyncratic configurations, rather than using off-the-shelf infrastructure. Light is a strong theme, in particular the solid-state, digitally addressable light of the LED (essentially a free-floating pixel). However the optical in these arrays is always tightly coupled with other modalities, especially sound, which is either a cherished byproduct of the array mechanism (as in Rozin's Mirrors and Troika's Cloud) or generated by the array elements themselves (as in the drummers and UVA's Volume). A quality of liveness is linked with the turn to specificity and being-in-the-environment; from the "live data" of UVA's Massive Attack show, to the live interaction and generation of their later installations, to the live video driving Rozin's Mirrors. Performance and temporary installation are the dominant forms here - emphasising the intensified moment, rather than the any-time of static content.

3. Projection Mapping and Extruded Light

In one sense these arrays present a disintegration of the screen - they pull its elements apart and embed them in the environment. In another strain of media arts practice, something like the converse occurs, though with what I will argue are similar interests and agendas. In this approach screen-like technologies are used intact, rather than decomposed; but their function and their relationship to the environment is transformed. These works reverse-engineer the digital image, exploiting its digital (general) malleability in order to fit it to a specific environment.

The work of Norwegian artist HC Gilje illustrates one trajectory of this second post-screen approach. Gilje's work from the late 90s was in live digital video, with his ensemble 242.pilots. This practice was linked to the burgeoning activity in experimental electronic music at the time; here again, performance, improvisation and the intensified moment - what Gilje calls an "extended now" - are central concerns, though the work is strongly screen-focused in its results . In Gilje's work over the following decade, he demonstrates another path towards the post-screen. Gilje's nodio (2005-) is a custom software system for distributing video content across collections of linked "nodes". In drifter (2006) these nodes are manifest as a ring of twelve screens which form a linked audiovisual interspace. With dense (2007) these nodes take on a more sculptural presence - hanging strips of fabric illuminated from both sides with a tailored video-projection. Here Gilje adapts the screen technology of the video projector to a sculptural environment, pushing it one step away from image and towards illumination. The work also depends on a specific material surface - the translucent weave of the fabric enables the double-sided layering of pattern.


shift (2008) (above) develops this approach: a technique known as projection mapping, in which the projected image is reverse-engineered to fit a specific surface. In shift Gilje's nodes are simple rectangular boxes, constructed from plywood. Using more custom software, the artist illuminates a cluster of these boxes with precisely mapped projected images. The coupled sound emanates from speakers housed in each box, so the objects are again audiovisual (and acoustically distinct) nodes; Gilje composes material for this environment in search of what he terms "audiovisual powerchords" - moments of intense juxtaposition and interplay. In blink (2009) Gilje dispenses with the boxes, instead treating the bare installation space. Simple, geometric elements - angular lines and bands of tone and colour - are reflected and modulated by the space itself, diffusing from irregular polished floorboards and painted walls. The work plays the room with articulated light, carefully matched to its geometry in way that heightens our awareness of the interplay of space, light and materials.

Projection mapping has recently flourished in "visualist" practice across art, design and performance contexts; trompe-l'oeil architectural facades are one popular genre, manipulating the built environment by rendering it with a tailored skin of articulated light (see for example Urbanscreen's Kubik 555). German designers Grosse 8 and Lichtfront demonstrate a logical extension of the technique, using multiple projectors to create an "augmented sculpture" in the round.


Another notable example is Scintillation (2009) (above) by Xavier Chassaing, a digital stop-motion film in which projection mapping is used to layer a domestic environment with luminous swirls of particles, igniting the petals of an orchid and tracing the curves of a moulded plaster cornice [24]. As in Gilje's blink, Scintillation emphasises the ambience of the projected light - reflections and diffusions are heightened by hand-held macro cinematography, artfully producing an impression of material texture. But in the process it raises some interesting problems for our analytical premise - a shift from the screenful image to something more live and specific. For Scintillation is absolutely a work of filmmaking; here projection mapping - the tailored materialisation of the image - is deployed as a technique for producing generalisable, substrate-independent image content.


The final example in this survey addresses the same tension. In their recent short film Making Future Magic (above), London design agency Berg give an ingenious demonstration of both the material turn of post-screen imaging, and its recuperation as image content. Berg developed an animation technique combining multiple-exposure stop-motion with a hand-held source of articulated light - specifically the glowing rectangle of the moment, Apple's iPad. 3d forms are digitally modelled and animated, then decomposed into sequences of 2d slices. These slices are then replayed into the environment, and thus recomposed into 3d forms, by moving an iPad screen over successive still frame exposures. As Berg term it, this is "extruded light" - as in UVA's latest work, it's as if light itself has been unpinned from its substrate. The results are a beguiling combination of loose, organic light painting with simple 3d geometry and DSLR imaging. As Berg frame the work, it fits entirely within the post-screen turn proposed here. Responding to a brief around "a magical version of future media", Berg are "exploring how surfaces and screens look and work in the world ... finding playful uses for the increasingly ubiquitous ‘glowing rectangles’ ...". Again the material embeddedness of this articulated light is emphasised - the way it reflects from puddles and diffuses through foliage. Screen as object in the world, rather than window to somewhere else. As in Scintillation however the inescapable irony is that the outcomes of this work are entirely bound up with screenful images - with the generalising infrastructures and distribution pipelines of social image sharing, print-on-demand and networked video.

4. Transmateriality and Presence Culture

To recap briefly: the ubiquitous digital screen is characterised by both generality - an ability to display any content at all - and self-effacing slightness - it tries to make itself disappear as a neutral substrate for content. In contrast to these tendencies this paper describes two distinct but parallel strains of "post-screen" practice in the media arts and design. Arrays mimic the grid configuration of the screen, but lower its resolution and emphasise the material presence of the array elements - their local and individual specificity is balanced with their malleable generality (their ability to carry anything-at-all). Projection mapping and "extruded light" practices also emphasise specificity, materiality and a local, performative being-in-the-world, but they do so by different means - exploiting the malleability of the digital screen (and the computational representations it hosts) in order to make it intensely site-specific. To the extent that they both adapt and resist the attributes of our familiar glowing rectangles, we could describe these practices as post-screen, but this "post" is nothing like a conscious critique, let alone a revolutionary break. However hard they may pull towards specificity and local materiality, they are readily - by design or necessity - recaptured as screen fodder.

Both these post-screen tendencies and their screenful recuperation can be usefully framed through the notion of transmateriality, a concept that attempts to capture a fundamental duality in digital (and other) media: they are everywhere and always material, yet often function as if they are immaterial. In a transmaterial view media always operate as local material instances (this is their aspect of specificity) yet retain the ability to hold specificity at bay - resisting the contingencies of flux - to create a functional generalisation in which this pixel is the same as that one, the email I send is the same as the one you receive, and one node on the network is much the same as any other.

In the glowing rectangle paradigm functional generality is entirely dominant. The work considered here, on the other hand, revels more in the pleasures and practices of specificity - the clatter of servo-actuated wood or the play of light on this particular wall. In their push towards liveness (of interaction or data), performativity, their integration of sound, and their emphasis on evanescent materiality, these works evoke what Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht would call "presence culture" - that mode of apprehending the world which is characterised by fleeting but intense moments of being, and a sense of being part of the world of things, rather than outside it, looking in. Gumbrecht constructs presence in opposition to a dominant "meaning culture", in which the essence of material things can be obtained only through interpretation. Gumbrecht describes the relationship between these poles as one of dynamic oscillation. "Presence phenomena" become "effects of" presence, "because we can only encounter them within a culture that is predominantly a meaning culture. ... [T]hey are necessarily surrounded by, wrapped into, and perhaps even mediated by clouds and cushions of meaning".

In exactly the same way we find an inevitable oscillation here between screen and post-screen. We can align the screen with generality and meaning culture, and the post-screen with specificity and presence culture; but here too the post-screen is evanescent and elusive, instead existing largely within the dominant screen culture. However this is not to discount the utopian aspirations of a post-screen practice, which might instead be located through the perspective of transmateriality. For in echoing the screen, or in literally bending it to the local, present and specific, these works operate as reminders of the ubiquitous and everyday materiality of our media, of the fact that depite appearances, every glowing rectangle is already local and specific. If that specificity is latent, then these works demonstrate practical strategies for making it explicit; from hardware hacking to modular LEDs and custom software, they participate in what might be called "expanded computing", using the malleability of digital media to reactivate its presence - and thus our presence, too - in the world of things.

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Thursday, October 02, 2008

Synesthesia and Cross-Modality in Contemporary Audiovisuals

Though written about a year ago, this essay has just been published in Senses and Society. It's related to the Synchresis project posted earlier but makes a more rigorous investigation of synaesthesia, as it is (so often) applied to fused or algorithmic audiovisuals. After a quick tour through the history of synaesthesia in the arts, it uses some nifty perceptual neuroscience to argue for an alternative model, of contemporary audiovisuals as cross-modal objects that reveal the space of relation between modalities - the map. It takes work by Andrew Gadow (below) and Robin Fox as case studies, but also touches on Oskar Fischinger, Robert Hodgin, Norman McLaren and others. The version here has plenty of pics and vids; for a more paper-based experience grab the pdf (and please use the print version for any citations). Oh and pardon the American spellings here - journal style.




In the age of ubiquitous digital media, synesthesia is everywhere. In human, neurological form, it is rare: for perhaps three in a hundred people, a stimulus in one sensory modality automatically induces a sensation in another. Auditory-to-visual synesthesia, or “colored hearing” is much rarer still. Yet now this phenomenon is realised, apparently, inside every digital music player, on VJ screens in every club, in robot lightshows. On these screens sound is transformed into visual pattern and form instantly and automatically; an exotic perceptual phenomenon becomes a technically mediated commonplace.

In fact digital synesthesia is a trope that occurs in the production and use of mainstream digital media, as well as the media arts. Computer users find audio visualisers built in to their music players; as this software shows, audiovisual relations can now be reduced to an algorithm, a formal procedure that interprets (sound) and emits (image) data; though in this case the results are mostly mundane psychedelia. In some recent music video audio visualisations are integrated into the narrative and performative conventions of the genre; in Justin Timberlake’s Lovestoned video (2007) the singer’s image is constructed from the flickering bands of a visualised audio spectrum. Here a technically guaranteed unity of sound and image is literally reinscribed on to the performing artist. In contemporary media arts practice the same techniques – computational analysis of sound driving generated visual elements – are widespread, and its aesthetics more diverse. In custom-coded audio visualisations artists such as Marius Watz (2005) and Robert Hodgin (2007) (below) construct visualisations tuned to specific soundtracks; the automatism of digital synesthesia animates specific, constructed worlds of form and image. The algorithm becomes an endlessly variable and dynamic intermediary between sound and image.


In a distinct but related approach, some media artists have opted instead to simplify or reduce that audiovisual relation, ofen bypassing computation altogether. In Carsten Nicolai’s Telefunken works (2000,2004) the stereo output of an audio CD player is connected to the audio and video inputs of a television screen; what is heard as synthetic tones and noisy drones, is seen on the screen as patterns of monochrome form and line. In an approach I will refer to here as transcoding, sound and image are linked through a direct transfer of signal, a simple cross-wiring.


Australian artist Robin Fox plugs audio from a custom-built digital synthesiser into an oscilloscope; in the resulting hybrid instrument, Fox explores a territory in which signal is simultaneously heard and seen; every sound is a form in motion, every form a sound (above). The connection, the cross-wiring of sound to image, literally manifests the sensory cross-over of synesthesia; more, the work itself seems to somehow induce synesthetic experience. The correspondence between sound and image is immediate, agile and intense; the audiovisual relation is completely consistent, somehow self-evident, yet continually surprising. There’s a feeling of something like revelation; one reviewer describes Fox’s Backscatter DVD (2005) as “mesmerizing” and “overwhelming,” and hints at a sense of “greater significance or higher purpose” (Baker Fish 2005). Andrew Gadow’s work approaches the same relationship from the other side; working with an old video synthesiser, he transfers its image signal directly into audio. The scan-line structure of the video signal becomes audible as modulations of a 50 Hz hum; flickering, disintegrating visual textures become abrasive but intricately detailed buzzsaw audio. Again the subjective experience can be powerful, a visceral sense of force or encounter; the audiovisual coupling is so close that it seems to disappear, distinct modalities fuse into raw sensation.

Synesthesia is widely used as an analogy around this work. The analogy provides a mapping that aligns subjective sensation with audiovisual signals; it maps perceptual or even neurological structures onto technical structures. The analogy also plays another role, foregrounding sensation in the reception of the artworks; proposing to operate, for the subject, at the level of direct sensation. Finally, synesthesia also connects this contemporary work with a historical artistic tradition. The new automatic or transcoded fusion of sound and image seems to mark the culmination of a practice spanning music, painting, film and electronic media and aspiring, as Jeremy Strick writes, to the ideal of synesthesia as “the unity of the senses, and, by extension, the arts.” (Strick 2005: 15) The 2005 Visual Music exhibition, curated by Strick, documents this tradition in detail, as well as making a bid for its continuation into the present:
In digital media ... music and visual art are ... created out of the same stuff, bits of electronic information ... . [T]he aspiration to novel experience created by the compounding of sensation and association has never been more possible. (ibid.)
This paper’s main aim is to test this analogy, and the related historical drive that Strick suggests; to consider if, and how, such practice can be thought of as synesthetic, and examine structural parallels between synesthesia as a perceptual and neurological phenomenon, and the automatic or transcoded linking of audio and visual media? Following the tradition of artistic synesthesia that Strick invokes, the approach here is to provisionally ignore the glaring gap in this analogy, between subjective sensation and objective, technical artefact. Scientific work in perception and neuropsychology is drawn in for a more detailed account of synesthesia; but it also offers an alternative model for this practice, based on theories of cross-modal interactions in normal perception. Close correlations between sound and image are, after all, an everyday perceptual occurrence. From this perspective, tightly correlated audiovisuals direct us towards the abstract structures that are its generative materials: signal, as distinct from image or sound; and the map, the pattern of correlation between signals in different domains. Although artists such as Fox and Gadow use obsolete, analog technologies, their work is a sensory manifestation of these characteristically contemporary abstractions.

Synesthesia

Scientists studying synesthesia define it as occurring “when stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers perception in a second modality” (Harrison and Baron-Cohen 1996: 3). There are many documented forms of synesthesia; stimuli such as numbers, letters, words, days of the week, and musical tones may trigger perceived color and shape; taste, smell and pain can also trigger perceptions of shape. Estimates of the prevalence of synesthesia vary widely between 1 in 20 and 1 in 20 000; one recent study found a prevalence of around 3% and showed that calendar-color and letter- and number-color forms occur most often, while audiovisual synesthesia or “colored hearing” is comparatively rare (Simner et al 2006).

After long being debunked or treated as a curiosity, synesthesia has attracted increasing scientific attention, and validation, in recent years. Neuropsychologist Richard Cytowic undertook one of the first modern studies (Cytowic 1989). As well as a basic validation – finding that synesthesia is a real phenomenon with a neurological basis – Cytowic proposed a set of diagnostic and clinical features of the condition (Cytowic 1996: 23-31). He found that synesthesia is “involuntary but elicited,” an automatic perceptual experience that cannot be supressed or controlled. Synesthetic perceptions are “durable and generic,” meaning that an individual’s cross-sensory connections do not change over their lifetime, and that synesthetic perceptions are elementary and general, rather than “elaborated” – for example colors and simple shapes, rather than a detailed mental picture. Cytowic also points out that synesthetic perceptions are unusually memorable: some synesthetes use their triggered percepts as an index that aids their recall of the evoking stimulus. Moreover, Cytowic states, synesthesia is an emotional experience, “accompanied by a sense of certitude (the ‘this is it’ feeling)” that he links to William James’ description of religious ecstasy, and in particular the affect of noesis, “knowledge that is experienced directly, an illumination that is accompanied by a feeling of certitude.” It is in part this affective dimension that leads Cytowic to propose a linkage between synesthesia and the limbic brain – associated with emotion and a sense of “salience.”

More recent science has continued to investigate the neurology and psychology of synesthesia, using modern imaging techniques to show activation in the anatomy of the synesthetic brain, as well as behavioural experiments that seek out the parameters of synesthetic experience. Recent work has confirmed Cytowic’s finding that synesthesia is involuntary and perceptually real, though the results also suggest that there is significant variation between synesthetic individuals (see for example Hubbard and Ramachandran 2005). Discussion centers on where synesthesia occurs in the notional chain of perceptual processing; for a minority of synesthetes it seems to occur early in the chain, before cognitive processes such as attention; for the rest it seems to occur later; Ramachandran and Hubbard label these forms"lower” and “higher” (2001: 14). There is general consensus that synesthesia has a neural basis in the form of increased connectivity between normally separate neural regions or modules (contrary to Cytowic’s limbic model), though the connective mechanism and architecture is debated. Some, including Ramachandran and Hubbard, propose that this connectivity is a result of defective “pruning” of neural connections, suggesting that synesthetic cross-wiring is a normal early developmental stage. The notion of synesthesia as common, underlying or originary is supported by the correlations between synesthetic and “normal” cross-sensory associations; despite individual differences in color-tone mapping, non-synesthetes and those with “colored hearing” make similar mappings between pitch and lightness (Marks 1996: 72). Similarly Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001:19) cite the consistency of an (albeit simple) mapping between shape and sound to support the same point: asked to link two shapes, one round, one spiky, with two names, bouba and kiki, subjects overwhelmingly associate kiki with the angular form and bouba with the rounded one. The authors continue, in one of the more expansive examples of synesthesia science, to propose links between this “normal” synesthesia and the angular gyrus, an anatomical region associated with cross-modal association as well as numeracy, the neurology of metaphor, emotion, art and the evolution of language. In this formulation synesthesia is an extreme case that offers clues to the neurology of normal – and significant – human abilities to associate and synthesise disparate sensations and concepts.

Synesthesia in the Arts: Models and Maps

The history of synesthesia in the modern arts is well documented, and will not be recounted in detail here. More important for this argument is a sense of the major strains or variants of the concept, and their creative implications. This lineage has been traced to Romantic and Symbolist interests in the correspondence of the senses; poems of Rimbaud and Baudelaire correlated letters, colors, smells and sounds (see for example Cook 1998:25). In what Judith Zilczer (2005: 26) terms the mystical strain of artistic synesthesia, these sensory correspondences were held to refer to a higher, unitary reality, informed by Theosophy and Romantic philosophy. Kandinsky, reputedly a synesthete with “colored hearing,” is the best known of a group whose painterly abstraction was informed by musical and synesthetic analogies. In Kandinsky’s Concerning the Spiritual in Art (1977: 25) sensation, and especially color, can set the soul vibrating like a musical instrument: his aim was a form of absolute or “nonobjective” visual art, comparable to music. Cook (1998: 46) describes this model, informed by Goethe’s philosophy, as triangular. Both sound and color derive from the spiritual, or higher vibration, at the apex; thus sound and color have no inherent correspondence but “correspond to one another in so far as they embody the same ultimate meaning.” In a second wave of visual music between the wars, artists such as Paul Klee, Man Ray, Georgia O’Keefe and Arthur Dove adopted more concrete and structural models of correspondence, attempting to map harmony, counterpoint and rhythm into the abstract picture plane (see for example Zilczer 2005: 52-67). Synesthesia itself plays a shifting role in this context. Kandinsky and composer Alexander Scriabin seem to have experienced it, while many other artists were inspired by, or in some cases literally borrowed, synesthestic correspondences. Discussing the influence of Kandinsky’s note-color correpondences on Schoenberg, Cook (1998: 49) proposes a “cultural synesthesia” – where the idea of sensory correspondence can carry a cultural value independent of its actual experience.

In fact cultural synesthesia – evoked, suggested, implied or idealised synesthesia – dominates the visual music tradition; there are very few instances of actual, spontaneous, automatic audiovisual correspondences. In the work of Messiaen, Scriabin and perhaps Schoenberg (via Kandinsky), synesthetic experience formed the basis for a systematised set of pitch-color correspondences, though even these are not straightforward. The correspondences are different for each composer, as we would expect based on recent science. Moreover each is conditioned by what Cook (1998:46) argues is a mixture of subjective and cultural factors. Any correspondence between the continuous color spectrum and the discrete values of the Western twelve-tone scale is dubious – though these correspondences flourished in the early twentieth century in the “color organs” of Rimington and others (see for example Cook 1998:37 and Peel 2006). Later emblematic practitioners of the visual music tradition, John and James Whitney, used tightly composed but again ultimately arbitrary relations between sound and vision. If, as Strick argues, this creative tradition aspires towards synesthesia, when it comes to practically manifesting that sensory relation it founders on the problem of the map, the pattern of correspondences. Of all possible relations between sound and vision, what is it that makes one different, or preferable, to another? While recent science suggests some underlying perceptual commonalities, the devil, and the aesthetic, is in the detail.


Animator Oskar Fischinger provides a near-precedent for transcoded audiovisuals, and demonstrates one possible solution to the question of the map. Fischinger’s Ornament Sound experiments of 1932 (above) explored the double identity of the optical film soundtrack, printing regular visual patterns into the 3mm-wide sound strip at the edge of the frame, enabling them to be automatically rendered as sound. Fischinger (1932) emphasised the potential of this technique for composers: “control of every fine gradation and nuance is granted to the music-painting artist.” This form also promised a newfound “definitive” control over performance: “his creation, his work, can speak for itself directly through the film projector.” Fischinger also recognises the visual interest in recorded sound waves; and although he anticipated their use in conjunction with animation, he did not envisage the “sounding ornaments” as visual content in themselves. Nonetheless, Fischinger had found a space of audiovisual correspondence that was preexisting and “definitive,” yet seemingly had limitless creative potential. The later work of animator Norman McLaren developed Fischinger’s techniques, synchronising hand-drawn optical soundtracks with animation in Dots (1940), and finally using the synthesised optical soundtrack as synchronised visual source material in Synchromy (1971) (below).


Contemporary transcoded audiovisuals realise Fischinger’s experiments by similarly bypassing, or rather abdicating, the question of the map. This is not to say that the map disappears in an unmediated or inherent audiovisual connection. Instead, for Robin Fox and Andrew Gadow as well as Fischinger, the map is found, rather than constructed; it is embedded in the medium. Fox plugs his laptop into an oscilloscope, which maps the left and right channels of the audio signal into the x and y axes of its display. This audiovisual relation is in a sense a readymade, an existing cultural/technical artefact. Its process is literally hardwired, embodied in the analog electronics of the scope, just as Fischinger’s was in the optical technology of film.

Fused AV and Synesthesia

Do transcoded audiovisuals then realise the synesthetic ideal, or literalise the analogy? We can draw some correlations. To recap, the current scientific consensus is that synesthetic perceptions are real, automatic and involuntary, and caused by neural cross-connections at some level of the perceptual system. The cross-mappings of synesthetic perceptions are highly variable from one individual to another, but highly consistent for the individual. The transcoding approach of artists like Fox and Gadow seems fairly close: in Fox’s oscilloscope work for example, images are created “automatically” as Fox feeds audio to the oscilloscope, cross-wiring audio to vision; Fox uses the oscilloscope’s hardwired audiovisual map, which is fixed and consistent; but that mapping is different to, for example, Gadow’s equally automatic sound-to-image mapping, based on the interchange of analog video and audio signals. Even the visual aesthetics of these works could be likened to reports of colored hearing: in Cytowic’s terms these are not “elaborated” percepts, but simple, abstract elements.


The synesthetic affect that Cytowic’s study identifies is also suggestive. Fused audiovisuals can evoke (for some at least) a similar sense of revelation or noesis. Fox’s oscilloscope works show us something that feels both self-evidently “right” and surprising or unimaginable; the primal phosphorescent dot shows us its universe, a set of relations that are manifestly coherent and consistent, but whose implications are unforeseeable. Fox’s compositional structure emphasises the process of revelation at times: Photosynthesis (AOR) (above), the opening track on his Backscatter release, offers an initially gentle introduction, as the single point of the trace is buffeted by rhythmic subsonic clicks before slowly unfurling into harmonic pattern; but by the end of that track wave after wave of complex, nested forms have emerged and co-modulated; each point on the path is another noetic moment yet each is consistent and coextensive with the others. Mandala I, following, demonstrates almost the opposite approach, as Fox’s micro-switched digital twitches call up flickering variants on the circular carrier wave; to push the cosmological analogy, this is some kind of faster than light travel – we traverse many places at once – but again there is a revelatory quality as we witness accumulating relations, both momentary – between each sound, its corresponding form and movement – and sequential, between each sound/form/movement and the next, and the next.

How far can this line go, though, before it falls into the yawning gap in the analogy? Audiovisual works are artefacts; objects of perception, not perceptions. To put it bluntly, synesthesia, by definition, occurs in the perceptual system of a synesthete, not in the crossed connections of a video synth. Once again, we can use the gap as a provocation, rather than an obstacle. One response is to think of these works not as replicating human neurology, but rather something else. “Artificial synesthesia” is the term used by Dutch neuroscientist Peter Meijer (n.d.) to describe his work on sensory substitution; his vOICe system transcodes video from a small camera, into synthetic audio, in an attempt to use sound to provide visual information to those with little or no vision. In Meijer’s words, “we are interested in forms of learned synesthesia (acquired synesthesia) that might result from machine-generated crossmodal mappings.” Among other things Meijer’s work suggests that perception is not a fixed set of channels, but a reconfigurable network; over time, blind users of the vOICe seem to integrate image transcoded into sound, as functional vision. A recent paper shows that the lateral-occipital tactile-visual area of the brain, normally associated with the tactile and visual perception of shape, is activated by expert vOICe users (Amedi et al 2007). Other work in the field of sensory substitution suggests that different forms of synesthesia can also be acquired: Peter König’s feelSpace belt conveys orientation through vibrating touch, providing a augmented sense that some volunteers were able to integrate over time (see Bains 2007).

Are transcoded audiovisuals some form of sensory substitution or artificial synesthesia? There are two important differences. Sensory substitution operates by mapping an otherwise absent modality into an existing one; absent vision into existing hearing, in the case of the vOICe, and absolute orientation into touch, in the feelSpace belt. However for most, audiovisual transcoding links two existing modalities, “channels” already in perceptual use. Secondly, sensory substitution involves long-term integration and interaction with the environment; we can learn new “channels” but only by feeling out and (literally) incorporating their correlations with our existing sensory matrix. There are some striking parallels, and transcoded AV certainly hints at artificial synesthesia and a rewired sensorium, but as bounded aesthetic objects these works cannot realise that perceptual transformation.

The Pleasures of Binding

Correlation, key to artificial synesthesia, offers an alternative approach to the perceptual aesthetics of fused audiovisuals. At the core of transcoded and other tightly linked audiovisual forms is an experience based on a correlation between auditory and visual elements. While synesthesia offers a neurological analogy for the generation (poetics) of fused AV, this correlated quality leads into the neuroscience of perception, and thus offers a way to frame these works from the other side, the side of reception (or aesthetics).

The detection of correlations in the perceptual field is a normal, and crucial, perceptual task. From an ecological perspective, correlations underpin the recognition of objects in an organism’s environment. Our perceptual systems “bind” correlated elements into groups that often correspond to objects in our physical environment. A cat hiding in the garden might initially appear as an unrelated set of visual elements – a light grey splodge here, a dark shape there. When we “see” the cat, we detect correlations between those elements that enable us to interpret them as part of an underlying object. The image of a hidden Dalmatian dog (below) is often used to illustrate this phenomenon.


As Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999: 21-23) point out, this process of binding has some interesting features. Binding is “sticky” – we seem to hold on to bound perceptual elements. Once seen, the Dalmatian cannot be un-seen a without a conscious effort. Moreover, the act of making a binding is pleasurable in itself: “the discovery of the dog and the linking of the dog-relevant splotches generates a pleasant ‘aha’ sensation.” The authors offer an evolutionary rationale for this payoff: “The very process of discovering correlations and of ‘binding’ correlated features to create unitary objects or events must be reinforcing for the organism – in order to provide incentive for discovering such correlations.” Our limbic system apparently rewards us for detecting sensory correlations in our environment, even in advance of the final “recognition” of an object: “at every stage in processing there is generated a ‘Look, here is a clue to something potentially object-like’ signal that produces limbic activation and draws your atttention to that region or feature.” These incremental rewards “bootstrap” the final moment of recognition. Ramachandran and Hirstein work this perceptual pleasure principle into a neurological theory of aesthetic experience, suggesting that artists and designers seek out and intensify the pleasures of sensory binding, creating artefacts that “tease the system with as many of these ‘potential object’ clues as possible.”

Ramachandran and Hirstein also go further in proposing that the discovery of more abstract correlations is also reinforced by a limbic reward (1999: 31). They relate this to the ecological imperitive for classification – our evolved need to establish correlations that group and distinguish objects in our environment: say, edible versus inedible plants. This version of binding operates diachronically, rather than the synchronous binding of visual elements into a recognised form. “Being able to see the hidden similarities between successive distinct episodes allows you to link or bind these episodes to create a single super-ordinate category… Consequently the discovery of similarities and the linking of superficially dissimilar events would lead to a limbic activation – in order to ensure that the process is rewarding.”

Cross-Modal Perception

How might processes of binding – the discovery of correlations – operate in fused AV, where the characteristic correlations are between, rather than within, sensory modalities? While studies of perception have traditionally focused on the senses in isolation, as independent neurological “modules", recent work has begun to explore the relations between sensory modalities. Media-based metaphors for perception encourage us to think of the senses as functionally distinct input channels. If sensory substitution shows that these channels can be re-wired, studies of cross-modal perception show that they are barely even distinct. The senses are involved in what Shimojo and Shams (2001: 506) describe as “vigorous interaction and integration,” mirroring Michel Chion’s description of the “mutual contamination” that characterises the audiovisual relationship in film sound ([1990] 1994: 9). Shimojo and Shams review experiments showing the range of these mutual influences: how vision can alter the content and spatial location of perceived sound; and how sound can alter the perceived intensity and timing of visual stimulus. We hear what we see, and see what we hear.

The perceptual trickery of these experiments is less interesting than what they suggest about normal perception. Just as the binding of visual percepts into a whole enables us to recognise objects in our environment, correlations in different sensory modalities cause us to bind those stimuli into a unified perception. This is illustrated with another trick, an experiment by Sekuler et al (1997), in which subjects were presented with two moving dots on intersecting paths. Two perceptual interpretations of this animation are possible: that the dots pass each other without touching, or that they collide and bounce off each other. Without sound, the former interpretation was dominant; however adding a brief sound at the crossing point biased perception strongly towards collision. This is an instance of cross-modal binding, where correlated stimuli in different modalities become fused into a coherent whole. It also suggests the ecological basis of cross-modal binding; that we interpret correlated events as cues to objects in the environment. The interpretation of sensory data seems to be shaped by pre-conscious processes that bind percepts into wholes; wholes that map onto ecologically plausible events. In the crossing dots experiment, sound binds with vision to alter our interpretation of the event. The correlated stimuli point to a common cause, a model that explains their coherence.

Fused audiovisuals are aesthetic objects founded on cross-modal binding. Ramachandran and Hirstein’s notion of the pleasures of binding applies here; in the transcoded AV of artists such as Fox and Gadow we experience sensory fields that are somehow entirely bound: completely self-consistent, devoid of extraneous elements. The affect that Ramachandran and Hirstein attribute to the moment of binding, the discovery of the Dalmatian – the ‘aha’ of recognition – seems to be intensified and prolonged here. It also suggests a connection between cross-modal binding and the noetic affect Cytowic identifies in synesthetic experience. If we accept the limbic payoff theory of aesthetics, then perhaps fused AV is a manifestation of this pleasure principle in the media arts.

Audiovisuals as Cross-Modal Objects

Cross-modal binding is not limited to experimental audiovisuals, however; in fact the opposite is true. Cinema and television constantly rely on our predilection for binding sound and image; this is the basis of Chion’s synchresis, a “spontaneous and irresistable mental fusion” caused by close synchronisation ([1990] 1994: 63). Lip sync is the archetypal example, where audiovisual correlation breathes life into the image of a body. Recall the ecological function of binding: to identify a common cause – an object in the environment. In most audiovisual media the objects are (all too) readily apparent. So if audiovisual correlations refer us to a shared cause, what is that cause in fused or transcoded AV? What is the underlying object, the cat hiding in the garden?

In a sound-to-image mapping, for example, it seems logical to propose that the cause is the source modality – sound. This involves a kind of reflexive redundancy; in Fox’s oscilloscope work, it would mean that the image is simply a pointer to the soundtrack, that it doubles or duplicates the sound. Subjectively at least, the relation seems richer and more complex than that; and it seems at odds with an ecological model of perception. Perhaps the common object is not the sound, but something more abstract: the signal. Signal here refers to a pattern of differences or fluctuations, a flux that, like data, must always be embodied but which, again like data, can be readily transduced between one embodied form and another. Fox’s laptop does not send sound to the oscilloscope, or in fact to the audio amp; it sends signal, a pattern of fluctuating voltage. That pattern is manifest on the scope as phosphorescent image, and when it leaves the speakers, as sound: but their common origin is the flux itself.


In transcoded audiovisuals sound and image perceptually triangulate a third point, the signal, that is imperceptible in and of itself. Signal maps to perception through the contingencies of both media technologies and sensory boundaries, but in itself it traverses these limits. This is apparent in Fox’s work, where subsonic fluctuations modulate the audible frequencies to create movements that are easily seen, but felt only as sharp thumps; the speakers struggle to transduce the signal into mechanical energy. Many of the complex, pointillist visual patterns are created by square-edged signal forms that again are acoustically impossible; the scope, more agile, is better able to trace them out. Similar trans-sensory signatures occur in Gadow’s work and that of other transcoders; Gadow’s Techne (2005) opens with a still blue screen and a raw, buzzsaw hum. The hum has no movement or form; as becomes clear as the piece develops, it corresponds to the blue video background. It is the sound of the 50 Hz scan-line structure of the video signal itself; so it looks like almost nothing. This is not to say that transcoded audiovisuals are reducible to the signal, an abstract or perhaps “higher” ideal, as in Goethe’s triangular model of color and sound. Here sensation and experience are foremost; these experiments feel out the ramifications of signal in specific circuits and transductions.

As Ramachandran and Hirstein suggest (1999:31), perceptual binding is both synchronic and diachronic, instantaneous and sequential. If the moment-by-moment audiovisual binding in these works refers us to their shared cause – the signal – how do these works operate in the diachronic axis? They often share a simple formal structure of establishment, development and elaboration, a successive playing-out of potential. Ramachandran and Hirstein state that perceiving “hidden similarities between successive distinct episodes allows you to link or bind these episodes to create a single super-ordinate category.” We can think of the sequential similarities here as products of the constant, underlying structure that shapes all the outputs of the system. That structure is the map, the specific but abstract shape of the audiovisual correspondence. The map is an elusive entity; rather than an object we can think of it as a procedure, a verb or algorithm; a way of transforming between modalities and their shared signal. In Fox’s work the polar mapping of the oscilloscope is an algorithm that transforms phase – local relations in time – and amplitude into circular space. Considered as cross-modal objects, these works direct us to the underlying signal; and the signal is embodied audiovisually through the intermediary of the map. The map describes a space of potential, a range of possible correlations between domains; and it is that territory, I would argue, that these works reveal as they traverse it.

Inframedia and the Map

In earlier work on experimental sound I proposed the notion of inframedia, “a stratum below or within the mainlines of electronic media” (Whitelaw 2001:51). The noisy textures, resonant fuzz, glitches, crackles and pops of electronic music since the late 90s reveal “the sensory and affective textures of a media substrate, rather than media ‘content.’” That substrate is a critical domain; media infrastructures are more than technological artefacts; they are rapidly changing focii of power. Inframedia aesthetics reflect a consciousness of that domain, while in its processes such work often pursues local and particular manipulations, hacks or diversions of those media technologies.

Fused audiovisuals – a practice with close cultural links to experimental sound and music – can be approached along similar lines. Like hiss and hum, the audiovisual aesthetics of signal direct us to the abstraction and transduction occurring inside, or underneath, our media streams. Glitch-driven audio is founded on cracks in the surface – moments of interruption which allude to, and materialise, their own infrastructure. In a sense transcoded audiovisuals are a prolongation of those moments, leading to a flattening of the surface/depth dichotomy of glitch; the cross-modal coherence of this work is based on a sustained exploration of signal. Instead of mapping signal anthropomorphically onto perceptual “inputs”, these works show us where signal and affect meet or overlap, as well as where they diverge; they show us signal passing into, out of, and through perception.

These works also direct us to the map – the abstract space of possible transformations between signals. That domain of transformation is also inframedial, a key structure in digital media forms and cultures. Lev Manovich (2002) has described this question as the “built-in existential angst” of digital media: “By allowing us to map anything into anything else ... computer media simultaneously makes all these choices appear arbitrary….” In almost all digital media, the map – the pattern of relations between input and output – is imperceptible, obscured or encoded. This is clearest in the work of artists working explicitly with data inputs. In the work of Alex Drauglescu for example, spam email is used as the input to an algorithm that creates complex three dimensional forms. The mapping – the process that transforms spam into form – is never revealed, and so a concrete, specific process becomes a blank spot filled in with an impression of magical transubstantiation. In some computational work the artist provides source code, an explicit specification of the map but one that is highly encoded and unavailable, in itself, to perception. In most digital media objects, the map is inextricable from the residue or artefact it shapes. We perceive only the output, the image, sound or form, in which the input and its transformations are collapsed.

The wider significance of transcoded audiovisuals is that they approach a perceptual manifestation of the map, that space of transformation. We sense it, in these works, interpolated between each instant and every other. It’s perhaps not surprising that this characteristically digital figure is manifest through largely analog means; as well as a critical distance from the digital, analog signals offer transformations that are rich and immediate. Crucially the maps themselves are simple and static – highly reduced, compared to their digital counterparts – and so more available to the aesthetic and affective explorations of transcoded audiovisuals.

The prospect of somehow apprehending the map is both esoteric and pragmatic. The map is the inescapable intermediary, the necessary condition of our data-experience; but what is the map, what is its shape, how does it transform this into that? What are its conditions, limits, bounds? These works literally feel out the map, and in the process begin to address these questions, offering a sense of the abstract transformations that underpin contemporary digital culture.

Synesthesia is a powerful and persistent trope in the audiovisual arts. As shown here it offers some enticing parallels with the techniques and affects of audiovisual practice, yet as a techno-sensory analogy it has inherent limits. As in the visual music tradition, synesthesia plays a largely figurative role, and it demands critical scrutiny as such. In this investigation however, the synesthetic analogy has opened a path towards its more everyday converse, cross-modal perception, which offers a useful framework for a neuro-aesthetics of fused audiovisuals. These two approaches converge in the figure of the map, the space of correlation; the feeling of noesis or revelation common to both synesthesia and cross-modal binding, could be described as the affect of the map. That affect is central to the aesthetics of fused audiovisuals; though I would argue it offers more than a neurological hit; it brings us into contact with the abstract but culturally crucial terrain of the map itself.

References

Amedi, Amir, William M Stern, Joan A Camprodon, Felix Bermpohl, Lotfi Merabet, Stephen Rotman, Christopher Hemond, Peter Meijer and Alvaro Pascual-Leone. 2007. “Shape conveyed by visual-to-auditory sensory substitution activates the lateral occipital complex.” Nature Neuroscience 10: pp. 687-689.

Baker Fish, Bob. 2005. Review of Robin Fox, Backscatter. Cyclic Defrost 10. http://www.cyclicdefrost.com/review.php?review=795

Bains, Sunny. 2007. “Mixed Feelings.” Wired 15.04. http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.04/esp_pr.html

Chion, Michel. [1990] 1994. Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cook, Nicholas. 1998. Analysing Musical Multimedia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cytowic, Richard. 1989. Synesthesia: a union of the senses. New York: Springer Verlag.

Cytowic, Richard. 1996. “Synesthesia, phenomenology and neuropsychology: a review of current knowledge.” In John E. Harrison and Simon Baron-Cohen (eds), Synesthesia: Classic and Contemporary Readings. London: Blackwell.

Fischinger, Oskar. 1932 “Sounding Ornaments.” Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (July 8). http://www.oskarfischinger.org/Sounding.htm

Harrison, John E., and Simon Baron-Cohen. 1996. “Synesthesia: an Introduction.” In John E. Harrison and Simon Baron-Cohen (eds), Synesthesia: Classic and Contemporary Readings. London: Blackwell.

Hubbard, E.M., and V.S. Ramachandran. 2005. “Neurocognitive mechanisms of synesthesia.” Neuron 48(3): pp. 509-520.

Kandinsky, Wassily. 1977. Concerning the Spiritual in Art. London: Dover.

Manovich, Lev. 2002. “The Anti-Sublime Ideal in Data Art.” http://www.manovich.net/DOCS/data_art.doc

Marks, Lawrence. 1996. “On colored-hearing synesthesia: cross-modal translations of sensory dimensions.” In John E. Harrison and Simon Baron-Cohen (eds), Synesthesia: Classic and Contemporary Readings. London: Blackwell.

Meijer, Peter. n.d. “Artificial Synesthesia for Synthetic Vision.” http://www.seeingwithsound.com/asynesth.htm

Peel, James. 2006. “The Scale and the Spectrum.” Cabinet 22. http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/22/peel.php

Ramachandran , V.S., and E.M. Hubbard. 2001. “Synesthesia – A Window into Perception, Thought and Language,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(12): pp. 3-34.

Ramachandran, V.S., and William Hirstein. 1999. “The Science of Art: a Neurolgical Theory of Aesthetic Experience.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(6-7): pp. 15-51.

Sekuler, Robert, Allison B. Sekuler and Renee Lau. 1997. “Sound alters visual motion perception.” Nature 385: 308.

Shimojo, Shinsuke, and Ladan Shams. 2001. “Sensory modalities are not separate modalities: plasticity and interactions.” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11: pp. 505-509.

Simner, Julia, Catherine Mulvenna, Noam Sagiv, Elias Tsakanikos, Sarah A Witherby, Christine Fraser, Kirsten Scott and Jamie Ward. 2006. “Synesthesia: the prevalence of atypical cross-modal experiences.” Perception 35(8): pp. 1024-1033.

Strick, Jeremy. 2005. “Visual Music.” In Visual Music: Synesthesia in Art and Music Since 1900 (exhibition catalog) . New York: Thames & Hudson.

Whitelaw, Mitchell. 2001. “Inframedia Audio.” Artlink 21(3): pp. 49-52.

Zilczer, Judith. “Music for the Eyes: Abstract Painting and Light Art,” in Visual Music: Synesthesia in Art and Music Since 1900 (exhibition catalog) . New York: Thames & Hudson.


Filmography


Fox, Robin. 2005. Backscatter. Videorecording. Melbourne: Synesthesia Records SYN012 DVD.

Gadow, Andrew. 2005. Techne. DVD-R courtesy of the artist.

Hodgin, Robert. 2007. “Trentemøller and Me.” http://www.flight404.com/blog/?p=52

McLaren, Norman. 1940. Dots. Animation. Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3-vsKwQ0Cg

Mclaren, Norman. 1971. Synchromy. Animation. Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jqz_tx1-xd4

Timberlake, Justin. 2007. “LoveStoned / I Think She Knows.” Zomba Recording. Music Video. Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIYXHLlxD8U

Watz, Marius. 2005. “Video for @c: int.14/37.” http://www.unlekker.net/proj/cronica021/

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Friday, September 05, 2008

Aspects of Transmateriality: Specificity

Transmateriality is a notion I'm working on that treats the digital as always and everywhere material - embodied from "end to end" - while maintaining a sense of how the digital functions as if it were immaterial. The core idea is well stated by Kirschenbaum (blogged earlier): "Digital systems are material systems designed to support an illusion of immateriality."

My proposal is that this view of the digital as material is particularly useful in looking at contemporary media arts. It resonates with practices across visual and sonic modes, generative art, data aesthetics; for me it also connects with Gumbrecht's presence and its tropes of manifestation and revelation. I'm trying to frame it through a handful of aspects or themes, provisionally: specificity, transduction, presence, ubiquity, materialisation and propagation. These aspects are inevitably connected - I'll add the links as they accumulate. In this post, specificity.

The digital is premised on generality; the ability to transduce a pattern from one instantiation to another, such that the pattern is effectively (but only effectively) independent of its substrate.
As Kirschenbaum points out, computing machinery works hard to support this generality, with the careful tuning of tolerances and threshholds, and the active interventions of error correction. Without these mechanisms a million entropic, material variations would creep in; dust motes, temperature variations, mechanical wear, noise. (Note how often these relate to the materiality of the substrate.) These would be incursions of specificity into the digital: local accidents, conditions of this or that substrate. The aesthetics of glitch reveal the material specificities of digital media systems by focusing on these incursions and cataloguing their qualities. So while the digital in general relies on holding specificity at bay, there seems to be a wave of creative interest in the specific material conditions of how the digital is manifest. Glitch is one clear example, but so is fabbing - more on that later.


The screen is the ultimate general-purpose substrate of the media arts: a homogeneous, uniform, dense, self-effacing surface. Yet recently we've seen a wave of arrays that can be read as anti- or post-screens: special-purpose displays that acknowledge their physical substrates. Think of Troika's Cloud (or indeed Rokeby's Cloud), Daniel Rozin's mirrors (above, his Wooden Mirror), or Art+Com's kinetic array for the BMW Museum (video). These "displays" show a renewed interest in the specific conditions of the manifestation of data - its local materiality (even presence) - rather than its abstract generality. They are also open displays of transduction: they tease apart the elements of the display to show how each one is discrete, addressable; a single micro-instantiation.

Digital sound and music - especially where it is real-time performed / improvised - also illustrate this turn towards specificity. A musician's rig is often a highly specific bricolage of hard- and software, acoustic and material sources, diverse technologies patched together. Oren Ambarchi's networks of effects pedals, motorised cymbals, and vestigial guitars for example. Performance in this genre is focused again on the conditions of instantiation, on specific transductions again, and how these circuits are materialised, how they vibrate in the air and in the assembled bodies, PA, room. Music also shows the interplay of specificity and generality at work here (and in the visual examples) - in Hayles' formulation this is incorporation and inscription. I can download Ambarchi's recordings and listen to them in my lounge room; I can make a faithful transduction, store it, back it up, copy it to my phone (always still materialised). The specificity that marks the artist's process recedes and instead becomes content for the functional illusion of digital generality. And then as it is reincorporated, materialised coming out of the speakers, it's specific again, folded into the everyday present of the lounge room and the evening.

Transmateriality is a useful concept, I'd argue, because among other things it can encompass this whole process without introducing ontological distinctions (or magical transformations) between one kind of thing and another - between data and matter. How does our view of computation - and the media arts - change if we think of it all as ultimately the propagation of material patterns? This involves throwing all kinds of useful abstractions out the window, at least initially - like data itself for example, or software. But my hunch is that if we can suspend them temporarily, they might return in a more interesting form. Your thoughts welcome, as ever.

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Sunday, August 17, 2008

Links, Tangents, Grids and Foam (Olympic Arrays II)

The previous post brought in a wave of traffic (hello!) largely due to the connective clout of City of Sound (thanks Dan). More importantly the ideas I sketched there have been drawn in to various other discussions, including some fascinating anthropological thoughts on sport, the (transhuman) individual and the collective. Interestingly some of the more thoughtful responses came via the newly-enlarged notes field in delicious. Rodcorp wonders if the opening ceremony will come to be seen as "the defining image of peak energy" - I'm not sure; I think the massive deployment of LEDs makes a sort of cake-and-eat-it statement about abundance and the spectacular. In other words, this is "efficient" spectacle. Does anyone have the numbers on the power actually drawn by the whole show? Sevensixfive takes up the "human pixels" as a harbinger of Deleuze's society of control - though for me Deleuze's notion of control as "modulation" resonates more (and almost uncannily) with the architecture:

[T]he different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry the language of which is numerical (which doesn't necessarily mean binary). Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point.

Which brings us neatly back to the aesthetics and cultural valency of computational architecture. I suggested that the organic multiplicity of the Birds' Nest and the Water Cube can be thought of as a post-industrial grid, where the regularity or (via Deleuze) control has in a sense moved inwards, to the level of the generative system. What we have is a kind of managed heterogeneity, where each element in the structure can be unique because computation ensures that it all works out the same and guarantees against failure. It's interesting, tangentially, that in the organic "models" for these structures - a nest of twigs, a blob of foam - the morphogenetic forces have more to do with local adaptation (to failure) than any global summation


This reading - managed heterogeneity - seems to work for the Birds' Nest, though on closer inspection the Water Cube is actually a far more literal grid. As Dan Hill points out, its bubbles are based on the Weaire-Phelan structure, a formal solution to an optimisation problem posed by Kelvin: how to divide space into equal sized volumes, with minimal surface area. One by-product of this minimal surface quality is that the structure resembles a lattice of bubbles - but these are highly idealised bubbles: uniform in volume. Moreover the Weaire-Phelan structure is spatially regular - as outlined here, "two irregular pentagonal dodecahedra (12-sided) and six tetrakaidecahedra (14-sided) form a translation unit with a lattice periodicity which is simple cubic." In other words, it's a cubic grid, though the modular unit is built from two different, irregular solids. Although I'd never noticed it before, the regularity of the grid is clearly visible on the building's surface - notice the recurring pattern in the image above (by Chris Bosse, via archidose).

As this Science News article reports, the design masks the grid structure of the foam by slicing it obliquely: "by cutting at an angle of about 111 degrees, [Carfrae] found a pattern that looked entirely natural. In fact, the pattern actually repeated in ways that were very hard for the eye to detect." At the same time, "That repetition was key, because it meant the building would be far easier to construct." So this is a formal grid, that's trying to "look natural" - and as such it's exactly like the terracotta warriors, whose "simulacrum of diversity" is constructed from permutations of mass-produced modules (see City of Sound quoting Craig Clunes, earlier in this conversation).

I'm not sure what this amounts to - perhaps it simply shows how metaphors (foam) and categories (post-industrial) are never quite what they seem, especially as they meet the pragmatics of real architecture and engineering. The Water Cube's hypermodern image rests on an aesthetic of "natural" variety and multiplicity - and after a week of the Games it's unquestionable that these structures are fundamentally machines for producing images (televisually, and literally, in the case of the Cube's illumination). But that aesthetic rests in turn on the modern industrial logics of the grid: modularity and regularity.

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Wednesday, April 23, 2008

There is no Software - Kittler and Evolvable Hardware

I'm slowly developing this notion of transmateriality; in this post, some media theory and a nice example from computer science. In the next I'll try to connect all this with some current art work, and back to the notion of the transmaterial.

Thanks to a prod from my friend Brogan Bunt, I've been reading Friedrich Kittler, a literary and media theorist who has made some striking forays into computational media. In a paper from 1995 he grapples, like Kirschenbaum, with the grounding of computation in matter, distilling this position to a wonderful aphorism: "there is no software." Kittler begins by announcing the end of writing; that texts "do not exist anymore in perceivable time and space" but have been miniaturised to the scale of integrated circuits. This miniaturisation, in which writing escapes the bounds of human perception, is facilitated by Turing's core principle of computing, which sets out minimal conditions for computation and proves its independence from hardware - the ability for any number of different physical machines to implement a universal computer. This principle, Kittler says, "has had the effect of duplicating the implosion of hardware by an explosion of software." "Ordinary language" is overtaken by a new hierarchy of programming languages, layers that reach from the command line down to assembler and the very protocols embedded in the silicon itself.

Kittler plays out this "descent" in which each layer depends on the one below it; the word processor depends on DOS, which in turn rests on the hardwired BIOS. Ultimately "
[a]ll code operations, despite their metaphoric faculties such as "call" or "return", come down to absolutely local string manipulations and that is, I am afraid, to signifiers of voltage differences." In other words, although they resemble "ordinary" language, programming languages return us to the imperceptible, inaccessable, too-fast and too-small world of the microprocessor. So, "there is no software at all," except as defined by the "environment of everyday language" that surrounds computation.

In a paranoid turn Kittler analyses the tendency of computer culture to "
systematically obscure hardware by software, electronic signifiers by interfaces between formal and everyday languages." In the GUI, but also in high level languages such as C (let alone Java), the physical machine is increasingly concealed from its users, and its programmers, in the name of functionality and "friendliness."


Finally Kittler considers the limits and thresholds of "programmable matter"; he points out that current computing hardware relies on the isolation of discrete elements from each other and thus a limit to connectivity. This contrasts with the "maximal connectivity" of the physical systems - "waves, weather and wars" outside the computer. The current approach to computing hardware is essentially more of the same: more transistors, more elements, smaller circuits with better isolation. Kittler instead suggests that the only way to "keep up" with the physical complexity of the world is to match it with "nonprogrammable systems" made of "sheer hardware": "
a physical device working amidst physical devices and subjected to the same bounded resources." In such devices once again "software as an ever-feasible abstraction would not exist any more."

Interestingly Kittler ends up close to where my earlier work on art and artificial life (published as Metacreation)
came to rest. In considering the desire for emergence in a-life art, I wondered about the constraints imposed by the physical substrate - the "coarse, rigid grammar" of digital electronics. My favourite demonstration of what lies beyond this grammar is the evolvable hardware work of Adrian Thompson, in which circuit designs for programmable chips (field gate programmable arrays - as in the image above) are evolved using a genetic algorithm and tested in hardware for their performance in a particular task. It's perhaps not surprising that successful circuits were evolved over many thousands of generations; but the fun part is that when analysed, these circuits were completely unlike any human-designed computing machine. In Kittler's words they were "sheer hardware," treating the chip as a "maximally connective" physical substrate rather than an abstracted set of discrete elements. Some chips drew on external influences, such as electromagnetic radiation, to achieve their evolved ends; so the chip is not formally isolated (but to quote Kittler again) "a physical device working amidst physical devices." Not only that, they were often "tuned" to the physical specificities of a single chip, despite the FPGAs being notionally identical - the exact opposite to the hardware-indpendence of the Turing Machine.


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Thursday, April 03, 2008

Strange Ontologies

Another piece of work from my time at CEMA; this one a paper, co-authored with Mark Guglielmetti and Troy Innocent. This paper started with some discussions about models in generative systems, and a feeling that certain kinds of models, or rather certain ontologies - formally defined networks of entities and relations - play an important role in defining the generative outcomes of formal systems. Troy and Mark are also very much into gaming (more than me anyway, my peak gaming experience occurred about twenty years ago and involved an Amiga 1000); as we talked it seemed that these generative ontological structures might also be at work in some of the more interesting games and game art projects around. Mark made me sit down and play Portal (below). Then we started discussing social software...


So in this paper we consider both philosophical and computational senses of "ontology", and propose that computational ontologies (or data models) actually implement philosophical ontologies (notions of what "is"). What's more these ontologies become dynamic, interactive processes; and that's when things get interesting. We focus on "strange ontologies": where default, common-sense or conventional ontological structures are tweaked or hacked, or where emergent phenomena pop out from apparently straightforward structures of being and relation. We draw on examples from social software, gaming (including Portal and Warcraft), art games or game art (including Julian Oliver's Second Person Shooter), new media / generative art (Guglielmetti's own Laboratories of Thought (below) and Jonathan McCabe's Origami Butterfly Method).


The paper has been submitted to an upcoming issue of ACM Computers in Entertainment; for now, grab the pdf and cite it via the permalink for this post. We're seeking feedback on this too - let us know your thoughts.

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