Lotus - Surviving a Dark Time

064 The Erickson Report for October 27 to November 10, Page 3: The CPC letter

So. On October 24, 30 members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus sent a letter to the White House that in effect suggested trying to open a conversation with Russia about a potential diplomatic end to its war on Ukraine.

The result was what Politico called a "firestorm" of hostile reaction, one fueled to no small degree by how the Washington Post described the letter, as one urging Blahden to "dramatically shift his strategy on the Ukraine war," calling it a break with official policy and a rupture in the party.

The reaction was swift enough and hostile enough that by that evening caucus Chair Pramila Jayapal was issuing a "clarification" and by the next day it had been withdrawn altogether.

But it wasn't a break; in fact the letter was quite anodyne, including praise and reasserting support for Blahden and insisting that no agreement can be reached without the approval of Ukraine.

So what got it in so much trouble? It comes down to this sentiment, quoting the letter:

[I]f there is a way to end the war while preserving a free and independent Ukraine, it is America’s responsibility to pursue every diplomatic avenue to support such a solution that is acceptable to the people of Ukraine. The alternative to diplomacy is protracted war, with both its attendant certainties and catastrophic and unknowable risks.

In other words, as The Intercept put it, "That the letter was met with fierce opposition is a measure of the space available for debate among congressional Democrats when it comes to support for the war and how it might be stopped before it turns nuclear: roughly zero."

So invested have the Democratic hierarchy and particularly its hack sycophants become in the glories of war and the shimmering image of outright military defeat of Russia that simply proposing the idea of talking about the possibility of a settlement is beyond he pale.

Indeed, it often seems those hack sycophants are more intested in "decisive victory" through "overwhelming force" than that hierarchy is. Bluntly, I believe that's because they see such a victory as proper retibution for Russia's having, in their minds, been single-handedly responsible for inflicting Tweetie-pie on us.

Among the worst of those hack sycophants is Markos Moulitsas, founder of DailyKos, someone fond of calling people "tankies," a 1950s-era anti-communist smear accusing people of maintaining blind support of the Soviet Union even after its invasion of Hungary in 1954. Referring now to the letter, he charged the signers "are now making common cause with Lauren Boebert, Marjorie Taylor Green, JD Vance, and the rest of the MAGA crowd. Which Ukrainians do these ‘progressives’ want abandoned to mass murder and rape, in their attempt to prop up a flailing Russia?"

Thus in one statement accusing them both of lining up with the worst of the GOPpers and of being on Russia's side in the war - siding with enemies both domestic and foreign.

But there is another point, which is that part of the reason for the "firestorm" is not what was said but who said it, that at least part of the response was the desire of the party hierarchy to smack down party progressives, who have gradually been gaining in influence.

The letter noted that Blahden himself has echoed some of what it said, having repeatedly expressed that only negotiations can ultimately end the conflict, that nuclear war is more imminent now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis, and that he's worried about the fact that Putin "doesn’t have a way out right now, and I’m trying to figure out what we do about that.”

What's more, on October 15, Saint Barack said during an interview on the podcast “Pod Save America,” that he is concerned about the fact that, quoting, "lines of communication between the White House and the Kremlin are probably as weak as they have been in a very long time. Even in some of the lowest points of the Cold War, there was still a sense of the ability to pick up a phone and work through diplomatic channels to send clear signals."

And precisely because Putin has so centralized decision-making, quoting again, "us finding ways in which some of that communication can be reestablished would be important."

Which is hardly different from what the letter said, just without the reference to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, just under a week earlier, retired Adm. Mike Mullen, former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during an appearance on the ABC show “This Week” that the possibility that Russia might use battlefield nuclear weapons "speaks to the need to ... do everything we possibly can to try to get to the table to resolve this thing," adding that it’s up to Secretary of State Blinken and other diplomats “to figure out a way to get both Zelenskyy and Putin to the table.”

Which in some ways goes beyond what the letter said.

Even former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, who was one of Obama’s key advisers and a staunch supporter of Ukraine, said he agreed with the idea of making the effort, doubting only it would get very far.

None of those statements - from Biden, from Obama, from Mullen, from McFaul, produced anything like the reaction seen here, in fact hardly any reaction at all beyond some tut-tutting that Biden may have overstated the probability of Putin actually going nuclear.

But no matter. It was members of the CPC that said it and they needed to be smacked down. So effective was that smackdown, so complete the capitulation, that not only was the letter withdrawn, the announcement of the withdrawal included the statement "Every war ends with diplomacy, and this one will too after Ukrainian victory." (That is, of course, my emphasis because it definitely needed to be emphasized.)

And the hierarchy smiles and the hack sycophants go back to scanning for hints of dissent.

Finally something not directly related to the letter and the reaction but something related to Ukraine and something you should be aware of.

Note that Biden said he's worried that Putin "doesn't have a way out." Well, a legitimate question is, once Ukraine didn't collapse immediately upon the invasion, did they ever want him to have one.

First, never forget that the US alone has to date given Ukraine $17.5 billion in direct military aid since the invasion. You can argue that every penny of that was fully justified, but point here is that you can't say we are passive observers of events or merely moral backers of Ukraine. The US and rest of NATO are directly involved. This is not a war of Russia versus Ukraine, it is a proxy war between Russia and NATO, with Ukraine the battlefield on which it is being fought.

With that in mind, recall that back in mid-March, as I noted at the time, there were some negotiations going on between Ukranian and Russian officials with some expressions of optimism coming from both sides. Not that a settlement was imminent but the progress toward one was being made.

Then on April 9, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson made a surprise visit to Kyiv, where, according to the Ukrainian news outlet Ukrayinska Pravda ("Ukranian Truth"), he brought two simple messages to the capitol:

One: Putin is a war criminal; he should be pressured, not negotiated with.
Two: Even if  Ukraine is ready to sign some agreements with Putin, NATO is not.

Three days later, Putin said negotiations were at a dead end.

Maybe the timing was coincidental, but the fact that Zelenskyy also lost all interest in negotiations right around the same time, a time, remember, well before Ukraine's recent battleground successes, gives a rather obvious interpretation at least some weight, further bolstered by the fact that at the same time - the first week of April - the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft was reporting that

there are several lines of evidence that suggest that the U.S. is inhibiting a diplomatic solution in Ukraine,

including, significantly, it's total absence from those very March negotiations, lending no assistance, offering no support.

Now, it's not certain the conclusion this points to is true but there is reasonable cause to believe it, a conclusion that creates the image not of the US and NATO causing the war, one of the US inviting or perhaps more accurately baiting Putin to attack - although that would not be unprecedented in US foreign policy - but one of the US and NATO allowing it to continue to take advantage of an opportunity to "pressure" Putin.

But "cause" versus "allow to continue" is somthing I would call a distinction without a difference. It surely makes difference to the homeless and the refugees; it even more surely makes no damn difference at all to the dead.

So we don't know if this idea is true, and in fact you have to hope it's not true because it would be quite heinous if it is.

Then again, war usually is.

 

048 The Erickson Report for February 17 to March 2, Page Three: On NATO

Next, I want to get back to what I said about permanently barring Ukraine from NATO being a not bad idea. The realiity is that, as I also said, NATO is a military alliance born in, based on, and still driven by thye shibboleths and demons of the Cold War. For decades it was presented as a response to the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, even though NATO predates the Warsaw Pact by six years.

Remember the map from last time, the one where every nation in blue to the east of that purple line was added to NATO after Mikhail Gorbachev was assured during discussions about re-uniting Germany it would not expand "one inch" to the east?

According Mary Sarotte, a post-Cold War historian who wrote a book about those negotiations, contemporaneous notes, letters, speeches, and interviews show that Western leaders were already contemplating NATO enlargement by the time those talks took place. It was always the plan.

So what I would say is revive what was for some decades an issue for the left and the international peace movement, but which for some reason faded - actually I can name several but I'll skip that for now: don't just not expand NATO, disband NATO. Break it up. Shut it down. It is a Cold War dinosaur that has become, as it is at this moment, more of a threat to spark a war - intentionally or otherwise - than it ever was to prevent one. It's time, it's part time, for it to just go away.

If you want cooperation, including on mutual security, you have the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE, of which Russia and Ukraine are already members.

If it's more economic and cultural ties you're interested in, you have the European Union.

What we don't need is a re-hash of the Cold War, but that it what we're seeing. And frankly I am damn sure that there are people in Washington, the capitals of Europe, and yes Moscow that are delighted at the prospect, even if not consciously, but who are thrilled at the prospect of a return to a simpler, clearer, age when there wasn't a complex and very messy political world to deal with but one with the comfort and stability of a clear, identifiable enemy presenting an always rather vague, diffuse, but ever-present existential threat.

I have to tell you, I remember that comfortable, stable time with its proxy wars, militarism, and leitmotif of Red-baiting. I have no desire to reprise it.

As I do this, the February 16 "day it will happen" is passing but the "it'll be by February 20" deadline is still ahead. Russia says it is pulling back troops but the US and NATO call b.s. So maybe tension is easing except maybe it isn't.

But it doesn't matter because as Politico's National Security Daily would have it today, February 16 was always "overhyped" and the real important day is February 20. Or soon after February 20. Or March 1. Or it doesn't matter because as one person they quoted said "Just because these dates come and go doesn’t mean the risk is any less." Just be worried all the time.

Things could be - in fact very likely will be in at least some ways - quite different by the time you see this: the difficulty of trying to discuss changing current events in a two-week time frame.

So I decided to plunge ahead with what I intended to say and if events prove that I got things totally and disastrously wrong, so be it and I won't hide from my failure. So onward.

Last time amid the growing drum beat of war at any moment, I made the prediction that Putin not invade Ukraine. 

And in fact, that has recently been made more explicit, with Putin complaining the US and NATO have “freely interpreted” the principle of the "indivisibility of security," the idea that no country should strengthen its security at the expense of others, a principle that is enshrined in international agreements involving both sides. That is, he is sarcastically accusing NATO of interpreting the phrase in whatever way it finds most convenient at the moment, without regard to any concerns of objections Russia may have.
 
Another reason I gave was that an invasion would be a bloody and difficult undertaking,
the biggest Russian military operation since World War 2, and that includes Afghanistan.

And I also noted that I had some backup of my doubts to be found in statements from various diplomats and officials of non-US countries.

So my conclusion was that Putin would not invade - unless.

Which is where I left it, saying if the following two weeks had not yet proved that I am a lousy prognosticator, I'd finish that sentence this time. Time has not yet proved my failings, so here we are.

Simply put, the "unless" revovles around the NATO - which really means the US - response to Putin's posturing.

Putin is trying to lay down a marker, saying "We will be heard, we will not be ignored." Putin is regarded by some analysts as a gambler in foreign affairs, as being "risk-tolerant" as it's put, but in laying down his marker in this case, he's taking the risk he's making a bet he can't cover.

The risk can be seen most easily and clearly in the frankly bellicose words of US officials.

For one, there was the statement by Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley, who said late in January, quoting, “We strongly encourage Russia to stand down and to pursue a resolution through diplomacy.”

For another, that same week the Biden administration and NATO told Russia there will be no US or NATO concessions on Moscow’s main demands, which revolve around Ukraine being kept out of NATO and the withdrawal of NATO forces from near Russia's border.

Some years ago I read a statement - I can't remember who, I'd like to give credit where it's due but I can't - that "faced with the choice between humiliation and war, nations historically have shown a depressingly persistent preference for the latter." The point and the relevance here is that if you don't want a war, you have to give the other side a way to back out of a confrontation without appearing to back down, a way to say at the very least "OK, I can live with that; it's not everything I wanted but I can live with it." Lacking such a way out, nations historically prefer war to humiliation. That concern is central to where we stand now.

And realize this notion of giving the other side a graceful exit is not an out-there idea: On February 14, Rep. Adam Smith, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, told MSNBC that “If we're going to prevent a war, Putin has to get something out of this. He has to have some sort of diplomatic face-saving mechanism to back down."

The idea has even been mentioned in mainstream news articles, often coupled with claims that the US is now offering Putin such an off-ramp. Unfortunately, that off-ramp consists of saying if Putin totally backs down, that is, withdraws all his troops from near Ukraine and drops all his other demands, including any objection to Ukraine joining NATO, we would be willing to talk about some tangentially-related issues outside the bounds of those demands. It's hard to think of that as being an acceptable alternative to Russia. Such discussions and even some decent results arising from them are certainly not out of the question - on February 15 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made specific reference to them - but they will not address the central questions.

Which just brings us back to the US-NATO position of "stand down, no concessions."

There are really only four reasons they would say such a thing.
- They are totally ignorant of that history of nations preferring war to humiliation.
- They actually want a war.
- They are really convinced an attack won't happen and taking the opportunity to look tough because they are convinced they can bully Putin into retreat.
- Or there is something going on behind the scenes of which no one is talking about even on background and so of which we know nothing.

Of those, the last is the most hopeful, although hard to credit considering how many potential leaky points there are. Nonetheless, I can hope it's true; it certainly wouldn't be the first time some back-channel deal proved to be the way out of a crisis.

The first reason I simply cannot believe to be true and the second one I have to believe and fervently hope is not true.

Which leaves what I think is the most plausible reason: They think they can bully Putin into backing down. In fact, a hint of that confidence can be seen in that at the same time the US was declaring "no concessions," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg declared that Russia should not only pull its forces from in and around Ukraine but also from Georgia and Moldova.

Frankly, if that's the game being played here, it is an insanely dangerous one, particularly when you bear in mind that Putin holds the 1990s as a "decade of humiliation" for his country, an experience he is unlikely to be willing to repeat.

Okay, so what can be done? There have been several ideas advanced; let's run through a few.

You have to realize the Ukraine is the key. So one idea is to simply accept Moscow's insistence that Ukraine be permanently barred from NATO. Now, that's actually not a bad one and I'd even go beyond that which I'll get to later, but right now it's not politically viable. It would be almost as much a humiliating retreat for NATO as the one being pushed on Russia by NATO. So in the present, it's a nonstarter.

However, what could be done is to emphasize the fact - and it is a fact - that there is no reasonable prospect for Ukraine to be part of NATO any time in the foreseeable future, if in fact ever.

The prospect of its joining what is a Cold War military alliance is based on a 2008 NATO statement which in the nearly 14 full years since has not produced what's called a Membership Action Plan - a pathway to eventual membership - for Ukraine. And Germany and France were and remain opposed to Ukraine's membership and getting in requires unanimous support from existing members. So Ukraine may never be able to join NATO.

Even Ukranian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has essentially acknowledged that. During a meeting with German chancellor Olaf Scholz on February 14, Zelenskyy said membership in NATO would take “longer than expected" and described it as a "dream," something Kyiv hopes to get to someday, but who knows when or, bluntly, if.

But instead of pointing that out except occasionally in passing, NATO and the US keep banging on the "anyone can join" drum as if it were a done deal and it's just a matter of some details.

Admittedly, President Blahden did say that Ukraine does not have the go-ahead to join NATO - but that was last June and is not found in the current rhetoric, at least as how anyone would notice. It's dispiriting and indicative of the idea that the US thinks Putin can be bullied because it is pushing pride over practicality, made clearer by that last week Jean-Marie Guehenno, former UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, described NATO’s non-stop enlargement as a "mistake" and said the 2008 promise was "hypocritical to claim that NATO enlargement was compatible with the development of real friendship with Russia."

Another related idea of what could be done is for NATO, rather than barring Ukraine or emphasizing membership is only long-term possibility, to declare a moratorium on new member states, a way to finesse Ukrainian membership without directly acknowledging the connection. Yet another proposal is the so-called "Finlandization" of Ukraine, which has a bad air about it because it has implied being subject to informal domination by Russia, but would really mean Ukraine declaring itself neutral and trying to maintain contacts and good relations with both Russia and the West, which wouldn't be popular with the pro-Europe western parts of Ukraine and would require a formal change in Ukrainian policy but still could be a viable option and over time become the normal state of affairs.

Yet another potential off-ramp for Putin, a way for him to, if you will, stand down without appearing to kneel, something that would give him that "face-saving mechanism" would be for the US and NATO to insist that Ukraine fulfill its obligations under a 2015 peace deal regarding two breakaway pro-Russia provinces in the Donbas region in the southeast of the country, a deal that was brokered by France and Germany and required Kyiv to offer self-rule to the rebel-held territories. Its implementation has stalled because of domestic opposition in the anti-Russian western Ukraine, but granting that self-rule plus surrendering even if not formally to the reality that Crimea is gone could well be enough to provide the "flexibility" to avoid a major war without anyone on either side giving up anything over which they actually have control.

Personally, I think that is the best option available and could be made even better if only because more saleable is for Ukraine to be admitted to the European Union - something to which it appears Russia has not objected - which would to some degree satisfy Kyiv's desire to closer ties to the West without involving any commitments of Europe or the US to the military defense of Ukraine or allowing for the stationing of any NATO forces or bases within it.

In fact, I'm going to go way out on a limb here. On February 15, Putin declared, without offering any evidence, that what is going on in Donbas is "genocide" - that is, genocide against the ethnic Russians there. Analysts are as you'd expect claiming that this is intend as a pretext for an invasion. Which, I have to acknowledge, it could be. However, he has been saying the same thing since 2014. It has served as the excuse for Russian military support of the rebels. Which prompts me to think that raising it right now, in this context, is a tell that what I just raised - a deal involving self-rule to the breakaway provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk - could be the key to a settlement.

As events unfold, we'll see how I do.

The Erickson Report for February 17 to March 2

This episode:

- "Putin will not invade - unless..." explained

- Government pushes, media embraces, unquestioning acceptance of official claims

- Disband NATO

- "The Threat" to public education

(Sources to follow)

So at this point, as of this writing, Muammar Qaddafi is nowhere to be found - he may be in hiding, in flight, he may have already left the country, or he may be surrounded and trapped. Whichever, in a very real sense it doesn't matter: The regime of dictator Muammar Qaddafi is over. And none too soon.

Now comes the real battle.

Before getting to that, however, I want to point out that this is not the first time Qaddafi has been in our (that is, US) gunsights. We have bombed Tripoli (killing Qaddafi's daughter in the process) and twice have shot down Libyan fighter jets in the Gulf of Sidra.

On the other hand, as I wrote in February,

Qaddafi ingratiated himself with a West addicted to oil when he withdrew his support for various revolutionary (or "terrorist") groups around the world and shut down his nascent nuclear weapons program. But those same Western nations turned a blind eye to his continued violent repression of any opposition. And here, once again, our preference for stability over justice, for convenience over conscience, may well come around to bite us on the ass.

As in so many other cases, our view was based far more on our interests than those of the people of Libya, whose subjection did not end at those times. Even as Qaddafi was described, just as Saddam Hussein often enough was, as "taking steps in the right direction" and maybe he really wasn't such a bad guy after all, the fact remained that his doing what we liked did not change the character of the regime, a regime now happily ended.

The question now is what happens next and are Libyans going to, as a good many Iraqis did, wind up looking back with nostalgia on "the old days" of dictatorship that at least offered some stability. A senior American military officer was quoted as saying "There [is] no clear plan for a political succession or for maintaining security in the country. The [African and Arab] leaders I have talked to do not have a clear understanding how this will play out."

The immediate and perhaps biggest problem is that in the course of the months-long stalemate that preceded the collapse of the regime

three distinct rebel factions developed – all with disparate identities and different tribal roots.

There were the originals in the east, drawn largely from a rebellious middle class; a second group in the centre, who fought the war's most intense battles; and the mountain men from the west who saw getting to the capital first as their higher calling.

The government established by the rebels centered in Benghazi in the east calls itself the National Transitional Council. It's authority has been recognized by 32 countries, but it has yet to gain the full support of other factions. The members of the NTC apparently realize that time is critical: They have announced intentions to move to Tripoli as soon as possible and have already drafted a constitution.

The question is if such moves will be enough: Libya is a fiercely tribal nation, one where ties to family and clan can easily outweigh ties to the nation as a whole. And with some 140 tribes and clans, each of which wants to lay some claim to a role in the new Libya, producing a unified government will take more than good intentions or even good ideas.

As just one example of the conflicts,

[r]ebel forces in the western city of Misrata, Libya's third-biggest, have gone out of their way to register their contempt for the transitional council with foreign reporters, insisting that they refuse to take instructions from Benghazi.

A potentially even more serious one relates to the suspicious death of rebel military commander Abdel Fattah Younis. In late July, he was taken for questioning by his own side - and was killed. The NTC investigated and now says it knows who is guilty but won't immediately name them for fear of hurting the revolution; the fear probably is of sparking tribal divisions.

That doesn't sit well with leaders of the Obeidi tribe, of which Younis was a member. They are demanding that the killers be brought to justice by the NTC and say their patience is limited.

“If we [need] to take our justice by ourselves, we will do it,” [Obeidi leader Ali Senussi] says in a tent surrounded by fellow tribesmen in Benghazi, after breaking the Ramadan fast. A nearby tribal leader adds: “Tribal law is stronger than government law.”

But just raising Younis's name raises another question: The nature of the NTC itself. Back in April I noted how the emerging leaders of the NTC were not the students, professors, and so on who sparked revolution, but often were former supporters and even members of the Qaddafi regime from business and the military who saw which way the wind was blowing and switched sides with the intention of trying to preserve whatever part of their influence they could. I wondered just what they understood the word "freedom" to mean.

I still do - especially in light of the fact that the rebel cabinet was dissolved earlier this month and there has been no move to appoint a new one.

Well, Abdul Fatah Younis is a good illustration of those doubts: Before defecting to the rebels, Younis had been in charge of Libya's special forces for the past 41 years. He had served Qaddafi ever since the 1969 coup that brought the dictator to power. Despite the claims he made to the contrary, he seemed poor material for a devotee of democracy and political freedoms.

The truth is, whether we are actually seeing the emergence of a "new" Libya or just the layout of a new playing field on which competing tribal blocks are eager to test their relative strengths remains to be seen. We (and to be clear, I mean us as individuals, not as the US) have to keep watching, hoping to be of good aid where and how we can while knowing there may be nothing we can do.

But pay attention we must because it is too easy to lose the thread of a matter. Consider Egypt.

After the victory of what was not entirely but still essentially a nonviolent revolution, the media was drowning in stories about the "new, free" Egypt. Then, they essentially stopped paying attention except for the coverage focused on the trial of Hosni Mubarak. That he is getting a public trial - as opposed to just being put up against a wall and shot - is being trumpeted as a great proof of the success of the revolution.

But at the same time that media ignored - or mentioned only in passing - a more important, much more ominous, development: On August 1, police and the military forcibly removed democracy activists from Tahrir Square, the square famous as the focus, the epicenter, of the protests that lead to Mubarak's downfall. The square is now occupied by military and police and

[a]rmed forces now surround the central square area, literally taking up the space occupied by the democracy movement only a few days ago.

Even more ominously, a few days later, on August 5, the military made an unprovoked attack on a group of a few hundred unarmed, peaceful protesters. They were on a traffic island off the square, where they broke their Ramadan fast and held a brief rally. They had made it clear they inteded to demonstrate and then leave and had no intention of trying to re-occupy the square itself. No matter: They were attacked by the soldiers carrying clubs. In the words of an eyewitness:

The soliders beat dozens of protesters indiscriminately, most of whom were simply trying to escape. I repeatedly saw groups of five to ten soldiers chase down boys who couldn’t be any older than ten years old and beat them with yard-long sticks. The soldiers chased protesters many blocks from Tahrir Square, all the way to the Kasr-al-Nile Bridge half a mile away, for the purpose of beating them.

Many dozens of bullets were fired as the soldiers chased the protesters through the streets, presumably into the air. Though there haven’t been reports of anyone being shot, though many protesters were hospitalized from their beating injuries.

Clearly, the purpose of the attack was not just to clear that little island of the square. The level of brutality suggests that its true purpose was to strike fear in the hearts of anyone who wants to make public political expression in the main town square of Egypt.

That eyewitness said these events meant that the members of the ruling Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Hey, have we forgotten that the military is now in charge in Egypt?) "don’t understand the importance of that place for the democratic development of Egypt." On the contrary, I'd suggest that it means that they do understand its importance and intend to redefine that meaning - as well as the meaning of "freedom" - on their own terms.

It is always vital, absolutely vital, to remember, in Libya just like in Tunisia and in Egypt: The battle doesn’t end with the end of the battle.

If you didn't, then you haven't been paying attention for the past few decades.

The U.S. may consider sending troops into Libya with a possible international ground force that could aid the rebels, the former U.S. commander of the military mission said Thursday, describing the ongoing operation as a stalemate that is more likely to go on now that America has handed control to NATO.

But Army Gen. Carter Ham also told lawmakers that American participation in a ground force would not be ideal, since it could erode the international coalition attacking Moammar Gadhafi's forces and make it more difficult to get Arab support for operations in Libya.

So what was explicitly ruled out before is now merely "not ideal." And if the "stalemate" continues, how long will it be before "not ideal" becomes "under consideration?" How long after that before there are orchestrated leaks by anonymous "official sources" of "on-going planning" for sending in the Marines "just in case" it proves "unavoidable" even as "the debate continues within the White House?" And then how long before there are "last chances to avoid direct military action?"

On April 30, 1970, Richard Nixon announced a US "incursion" (his word) into Cambodia, a significant expansion of the already-unpopular Vietnam War (and part of what turned it into the Indochina War). His administration was stunned by the reaction: Mass protest almost literally exploded on campuses across the country, leading as many as 500 colleges to close down at least temporarily due to student strikes. More than 1,000 demonstrations took place. About a quarter-million people (100,000 in DC and 150,000 in San Francisco) turned out on just a week's notice to protest the invasion. Within days, Nixon had to declare a quick end to the "incursion."

Ever since then, the operatives of the national security state have worked on ways to enable them to act without causing the shock that produces massive protest. The result has been that as a general rule, the bigger the commitment or the more opposition that is expected, the more gradual the roll-out so by the time it actually happens, the public has come to expect it and be resigned to it. Sort of like the classic "frog in a pot of boiling water" story.*

Part of the inuring process here has been the talk of "humanitarian" actions, the only goal being, we were told, to "protect civilians." But what such "protection" entails has already advanced from a "no-fly zone" to what I said over a week ago

bears less the marks of humanitarian protection of non-combatants and more the marks of choosing sides in a civil war.

Those marks have only become deeper in the time since: In his testimony on Thursday, General Ham openly referred to A-10 fighters being used for close air support for ground forces and on Sunday the rebels said NATO airstrikes helped them drive Qaddafi's forces out of Ajdabiya.

The war in Libya, for us, is not about protecting civilians. It's about overthrowing Qaddafi. The insurrection merely provides a convenient cover.

The reason for the step-by-step buildup to the ground troops which the general run of opinion says will be needed to do that is easy to come by: People don't want another war.

An AP-GFK poll found that 48 percent approved or leaned toward approving US involvement [in a Libyan air campaign] while 50 disapproved or leaned toward disapproving. Similarly, a Quinnipiac poll found 47 percent opposed, with only 41 percent in support. [Both polls were from the end of March.] ...

The same AP poll found the American people have little stomach for mission creep in Libya, with 78 percent opposed to sending in American ground troops.

So if you're going to escalate, you have to turn what could be an angry 78% into a passive 78% by getting them so used to the idea that when it finally happens, the reaction will be "Oh, really? Well, we've been expecting it."

The use of "protecting civilians" as a meme is, admittedly, an effective one because it allows supporters of the war to present themselves not only as pragmatists and "clear-eyed" people who "understand the real world" but as morally superior to war opponents who would "stand by while people get slaughtered."

For example, over at Daisy's place, when the war first started she expressed some skepticism over it. Someone responded that they couldn't "really agree or disagree" and "I don't have a horse in the race." However, he wanted to point out that not acting could also have consequences.

In response, I made what I thought was a very gentle observation.

While it's easy to understand [his] underlying frustration (both doing something and doing nothing have consequences) and thus the desire to "care less," the fact is when faced with that choice you don't get to opt out. You have to accept that, as he says, either way has consequences and then make the choice you think is best.

Disapproving of death by creating more of it rarely if ever seems a good course to me. The fact that "their" side always "kills civilians" while "our" side "inflicts collateral damage" with the accompanying impression that those killed on "our" side are somehow deader than those killed on "their" side only, at least to me, emphasizes that rarity.

There is already too much death in the world. I don't want to see us add to it.

Upon which, that very commenter, who previously said he "could care less" about the issue, not only endorsed the "mission" but hauled out the hackneyed "armed robber attacking the little old lady in the house next door" argument, where, as I put it in a further comment, "tackling, arresting, or otherwise restraining someone" but without killing them is equated with "cruise missiles, bombs, and strafing runs as if the difference was merely a matter of scale."

Which, I think quite bizarrely, he insisted it is, thus making arresting one individual morally the same as killing hundreds if not many more (Are we supposed to forget that there were people inside those tanks? Apparently that depends on who was in them.) and making objection to the war identical with reciting "a dissertation on Ghandi [sic]" while a "violent predator ... dismembers granny."

Thus does killing become the same as not killing, a billy club come to have the same effect as a bomb, and ground troops "that could aid the rebels" come to be the same as impartially and humanely "protecting civilians."

Seriously: You really didn't see this coming?

Footnote: As I write this comes news that the African Union has supposedly worked out with Qaddafi an agreement "in principle" for a ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the opening of talks toward "political reforms necessary for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis."

I don't know how seriously to regard this; Qaddafi has previously declared and immediately violated ceasefires. Since latest reports indicate his forces have (again) been pushed out of Ajdabiya - thanks for NATO "just protecting civilians" airstrikes - he could use the momentary lack of street fighting as an opportunity show his sincerity by ordering a unilateral stand-still ceasefire, where his forces hold their positions but don't try to advance. I certainly hope for that but my advice is, don't hold your breath.

In any event, there is little hope for such a settlement since the rebels, whose bottom line demand is Qaddafi's ouster, will likely regard this, quite possibly correctly, as just stalling for time and refuse to accept it. So the war, which has largely become a stalemate with neither side able to advance very far, will go on and references to "boots on the ground" will likely increase.

I wonder how many grannies (and sons and daughters and grandsons and granddaughters) have been "dismembered" so far?

*Actually, the "frog in the pot of boiling water" thing is a myth: Beyond a certain point, the warmer the water, the more energetically the frog will try to jump out even if the water is heated very slowly. Still, the myth serves as a good illustration of the political process being used.

But it is something I keep thinking about. I haven't written about it because every time I start, it expands and expands and.... And I give up in frustration. So I've decided not to try for full-scale explanations with all the appropriate links and background and try to just get to the basics. And it came out rather long anyway, as you can see. I wrote something related (and even somewhat overlapping) back in August but I feel the need to address it again.

I'm disturbed - deeply disturbed - at the attitudes taken in some portions of the lefty blogosphere regarding the Russia-Georgia war. Too many seem too eager to find ways to point fingers at Georgia and exonerate or at least downplay Russia's actions. I have seen, for example, references - complete with ominous italics - to "the US-trained Georgian forces." (I'm still not sure exactly what that's supposed to signify, but it appears to be very important to those who raise it.)

Some, such as Richard Estes at American Leftist, actually celebrated the Russian invasion. Richard called it "a decisive victory" and "a huge defeat for the US, NATO and Israel." Indeed, it was "a positive development for the global left" because "a US military outpost of the 'war on terror' has been overrun." Similarly, a commenter at Hullabaloo said the attack "should be lauded as a necessary setback for fascist Western imperialism."

But my deeper concern is not with knee-jerk ideologues but with what for lack of a better term I will resurrect the old word "trimmers." That originally referred to those who would philosophically trim their sails at the first sign of politically rough weather, who were, to extend the imagery, brave enough in calm seas but unwilling to face the storm. Here, though, I'm looking to an ethical, even a moral, trimming, an unwillingness to go where the facts lead for fear, I strongly suspect, of giving a sort of political aid and comfort to the neocons.

We saw that same attitude during Vietnam, where significant parts of the antiwar movement were hesitant to, avoided, even outright refused to make any criticisms of the North Vietnamese or the PRG née NLF for fear of giving political succor to the Johnson-Nixon administrations. In the years since, we have still proven unable to realize that it is not necessary to choose sides in order to offer moral criticism - that, in the immediate case, criticizing Russia does not mean endorsing Georgia's actions and even less does it mean endorsing US policy in the Caucasus.

Am I making sense here? I fear that I'm not, so maybe a couple of examples will better serve to make things clearer.

Glenn Greenwald, for who I usually have enormous respect, described as a "deceitful premise" the idea

that Russia's "aggression" against Georgia was "unprovoked" ...

Virtually the entire rest of the world - at least the rest of the world that is affected in some way by Russia and Georgia - has access to the truth[, he said].

Just to be clear, the quotation marks around the words "aggression" and "unprovoked," a method normally employed to cast doubt on the truthfulness or accuracy of the words so quoted, were in the original. To be even clearer, Greenwald is saying that the Russians did not commit aggression and were provoked.

Curiously, the article from Der Spiegel (Germany) to which he links in order to show how "the world ... has access to the truth," a truth which we have been denied, contains this paragraph:

But now, five weeks after the end of the war in the Caucasus, the winds have shifted in America. Even Washington is beginning to suspect that [Georgian President Mikhail] Saakashvili, a friend and ally, could in fact be a gambler - someone who triggered the bloody five-day war and then told the West bold-faced lies. "The concerns about Russia have remained," says Paul Sanders, an expert on Russia and the director of the conservative Nixon Center in Washington. His words reflect the continuing Western assessment that Russia's military act of revenge against the tiny Caucasus nation Georgia was disproportionate, that Moscow violated international law by recognizing the separatist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and, finally, that it used Georgia as a vehicle to showcase its imperial renaissance.

The "truth" to which Greenwald evidently refers is that, according to the article, Western nations have begun to doubt if Georgia was simply, as it claimed, an innocent victim in the conflict. And yes, there is good reason to doubt that: The term "gambler" to describe Saakashvili has appeared in several accounts; the growing conviction is that he gambled that he could reassert control over the breakaway province of South Ossetia in a lightning move, thus presenting Russia (and the rest of the world) with a fait accompli that would serve to head off any reaction. That was a gamble, quite obviously, that he lost badly.

However, the point is that Greenwald's own source says that the judgment of Russia - that it engaged in "disproportionate" "revenge," violated international law, and "used" Georgia to demonstrate its own "imperial renaissance" - has persisted. Bluntly, to refer to such behavior not as aggression but as "aggression" and to imply everyone else also sees it that way is worse than absurd, it is itself a "deceitful premise."

Meanwhile, Tristero at Hullabaloo approvingly cites an article by Robert English intended to provide "background" to the conflict.

As usual, [Tristero says,] the reasons are far more complicated than the US public is permitted, by their mainstream media and leaders, to consider....

I'm not going to critique English's article; follow the links if you want to see it. Suffice it to say it does provide some additional background but suffers from the common defect of trying to "explain" the roots of a conflict by deciding when the clock of history is supposed to start - so that whatever has happened after that point matters but whatever happened before it doesn't.

My concern here is that Tristero echoes Greenwald's underlying point, which is to say, in essence, "well, ya know, it's really kinda complicated, we really don't know everything, y'see..." followed by a lot of words that add up to mumbles amid shuffling feet.

But as I said in a comment at Hullabaloo,

[a]ppealing to "complexity" is too often a way to avoid the difficulty of having to make judgments and frankly the story that Robert English tells is not that complex; rather it is one of one sort of oppression leading to another sort, of a victimizer becoming the victimized. That is neither a new, nor all that unusual an, experience over the course of history.

So the appeal to complexity appears unnecessary, and the "however"s and "but"s sprinkled through - such as the supposed necessity to "discern the difference" between "an offensive, 'neo-imperial' strategy and a defensive, 'anti-NATO' tactic" (as if that mattered to the dead) or the claim that Russia was "lashing out at the West" (as if the secondary target was a mitigating factor) or the assertion that "the attack was ... a preventive strike against two NATO bases-in-the-making" (even as we condemn the idea of such "preventive strikes" when done by the US) - do more to obscure than to reveal.

Again to be clear, I'm not accusing Greenwald or Tristero of being "pro-Russia" or any other such bullshit. I'm accusing them of going out of their way to dodge making a criticism of Russia, of refusing to condemn the brutality, of striking a pose of studied neutrality while reserving their real criticisms for Georgia supposedly to provide a sort of "balance" (of exactly the artificial sort that is condemned when the mass media does it) but actually, I say, to avoid giving political ammunition to the Bushes, McCains, Palins, and Krauthammers.

And it is that which makes them moral trimmers.

But that still leaves one other issue: if the attack on Georgia was "unprovoked" or not. And here I have to say that in fairness it could depend on your understanding of what constitutes a provocation. Or rather could have if Russia had acted differently.

Certainly Russia had made clear its interest in the region. And it needs to be remembered that the region in question is called South Ossetia because there is a North Ossetia which is part of Russia. Those of the south and north feel themselves to be one people and the Ossetians are ethnically and culturally different from Georgians. South Ossetia became part of Georgia almost by coincidence: When the Soviet Union broke up, the boundaries were set according to those of the old Soviet Socialist Republics - and the Georgian SSR included South Ossetia. Those of South Ossetia have wanted independence from Georgia (and possible unification with North Ossetia) for some time.

So when the Georgian military launched an attack seeking to retake control of South Ossetia, an attack which produced some tens of thousands of refugees, apparently included attacking a base for a Russian peacekeeping force in the region, and during which, it now emerges, it may well have committed war crimes involving deliberate targeting and indiscriminate killing of civilians, Russia might well have felt "provoked." (Sidebar: Georgia, of course, denies committing war crimes but in this case I trust the accusers far more than the accused.)

But while some would stop there, there is more, because the clock of history did not start in August: A report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted

the announcement made by the Russian authorities in April 2008 that they would establish formal relations with the separatist de facto authorities in Tskhinvali[, i.e., South Ossetia,] and Sukhumi[, i.e., Abkhazia,]

and that Russia had been building up its military forces in the region. What's more, the "Russian citizens" in South Ossetia to which some trimmers have referred were actually the result of Russia unilaterally bestowing such citizenship, which could then "be used by Russia to legitimise the use of force to protect its citizens."

In the face of that, it would be easy to conclude that it was Georgia, not Russia, that was "provoked."

Another thing needs to be remembered here: The attack on South Ossetia by the Georgian army was not an invasion. As brutal, oppressive, and stupid as it was, it was not an invasion. South Ossetia was by universal agreement among nations (including, at that time, even Russia) part of Georgia and a nation cannot "invade" its own territory. The Russian attack, on the other hand, was an invasion.

Even so, if the Russian attack had been limited to protecting and evacuating its peacekeeping force, it wouldn't have caused a stir. If it actually had been for, and limited to, the original (and false) claimed purpose of protecting Russians in South Ossetia, it might have passed muster. And if it had been a "humanitarian intervention" to prevent a slaughter, those who advocate such uses of military force could have approved.

But it was none of those. The invasion's intended beneficiary was neither South Ossetia nor the Russians there and by the latter I mean both the Russian troops and the Russian "citizens." It was Russia. Russia's advantage, Russia's gain, Russia's "imperial renaissance." Its original claims of 2,000 killed in the initial Georgian assault proved to be wildly inflated and the reported total has dwindled to no more than one-fifth that number and perhaps less than one-tenth. (Which in context is still, I hasten to note, a considerable number.) Its charges of "genocide" were based on fantasy if even that. Its invasion went far beyond South Ossetia, deep into Georgia proper, occupying cities, ports, and military bases, killing over 300 and driving over 125,000 from their homes in the process. And once Russia had control of South Ossetia, it was required under the Geneva Conventions - the same conventions to which many of us (including, frequently, Glenn Greenwald) refer in criticizing US actions in Iraq and at Gitmo - to take steps to prevent revenge ethnic cleansing against Georgians in the area. It utterly failed to do so: The same BBC article that described the Georgian war crimes also referred to

the systematic destruction of former Georgian villages inside South Ossetia.

Some homes appear to have been not just burned by Ossetians, but also bulldozed by the territory's Russian-backed authorities.

The Russian human rights groups Demos says that on a visit to the area its representatives saw "pillaging" by Ossetians of the homes of Georgians who had fled the fighting.

And now Russia is making what the European Union monitoring mission in Georgia says are "inflated" claims of Georgian ceasefire violations, violations it will not allow the EU monitors into South Ossetia to investigate and verify.

All wrapped up in a neat package by Russia's formal recognition of the independence not only of South Ossetia but Abkhazia as well.

Let's get to the bottom line here. What the Georgian government did in South Ossetia was, in the words of one British diplomat, "reckless." It was oppressive. It was brutal. It killed perhaps hundreds, drove thousands from their homes, and quite possibly involved war crimes. What the Russians did in Georgia was every bit as oppressive if not more so, every bit as brutal if not more so, every bit as cruel if not more so, and also illegal, a violation of international law. And any analysis that looks for ways to downplay Russia's behavior to avoid making any judgment about it - and even acts as if the Ossetians themselves played no part in events - is leaning more on ideology than information every bit as much as anyone who tried to make this into a hackneyed "David and Goliath" story.

The Georgian assault on South Ossetia was wrong. Morally and ethically wrong. The Russian invasion of Georgia was wrong. Morally, ethically, and legally wrong. I believe it is incumbent on us to, to the extent we address the matter, condemn both but in doing so to be prepared to label one side's criminality - Russia's - the greater. And if that gives comfort to the neocons, so be it or what happened to our fabled devotion to the truth?

Despite the moaning rising from too many places, I just can't see that as all that complex.

Footnote: As much as I hate the idea of citing something from the libertarian magazine Reason ("Free minds and free markets"), still, as the saying goes, "If it's true, what does it matter who said it?" In the mag's blog for Monday, Contributing Editor Cathy Young had a piece in response to Glenn Greenwald. You can judge the piece for yourself if you want, I just took away this one quote:

If the Bush administration gave the status of expatriate U.S. citizens to thousands of people in a separatist Iranian province and then used their "protection" as a pretext to invade Iran, would Greenwald see moral ambiguities in this situation? Somehow, I doubt it.

Oh, no, I'm sure he'd be going "well, ya know, it's really kinda complicated...."

Another Footnote: Talks on the situation in Georgia are set to resume in Geneva on November 18. Russia wants representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to attend as well. Georgia initially refused to agree to that, then said through a deputy foreign minister that

Georgia would be willing to participate in informal talks with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But he said "legitimate" authorities from the two regions would have to be at the table as well, meaning the officials recognized by Georgia.

Russia's response?

"If Georgia really refuses to participate in the Geneva discussions while South Ossetian and Abkhazian representatives attend, this is sad," [Russian Foreign Minister Sergei] Lavrov said. "It is an outright challenge to all those concerned about regional security."

An "outright challenge?" In the language of diplomacy, that constitutes a threat. Russia, poor, misunderstood Russia, which committed no "aggression" but was "provoked," is threatening Georgia with unspecified consequences if it doesn't attend a conference that, structured as Russia proposes, would put Georgia in the position of giving at least de facto recognition to the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

A Third Footnote: Just in case you thought I think US interests have nothing to do with this:

U.S. President George W. Bush on Friday signed documents to demonstrate American support for NATO membership for Albania and Croatia. ...

Bush also renewed U.S. support for Georgia and Ukraine to join the NATO alliance. "Today I reiterate America's commitment to the NATO aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Montenegro," he said.

The Bush administration has been supporting Georgia and Ukraine's attempts to join the NATO alliance. "We see no reason that they shouldn't get MAP (membership action plan) status," White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said earlier in the day.

France and Germany both oppose the move to have Georgia and Ukraine join.

August 9. "The days pass by, too quickly it seems." And here it is, three days later. And just so the day does not pass without notice, this is a link to a post from one year ago today, a post on the second crime, in many ways the greater crime.

And again, if any among us are tempted to think this is all of the past, simply a matter of history, be aware that just this past January, while we were all distracted by the initial FISA fight, a manifesto by five of the west's most senior military officers and strategists, including former JCS Chair General John Shalikashvili, declared that NATO

must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the "imminent" spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction....

[T]he former armed forces chiefs from the US, Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands insist that a "first strike" nuclear option remains an "indispensable instrument"

of military policy. We may have forgotten nuclear weapons, but the generals and the rest of those who refer to them as "instruments" and value pride and politics above people, have not.